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Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and 
directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director 
abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater 
institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, 
and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These 
findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely 
associated with agency problems. 
 
JEL classification: G20, G34 
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1.  Introduction  
Economic theory suggests that directors residing at the apex of the organization are crucial to 
the well-functioning of the firm. In particular, they play a vital role in the internal control system 
that serves to resolve conflicts of interests between decision-makers and residual risk bearers. 
As a result, a large body of empirical literature has been devoted to the question as to what 
makes a good director. The literature shows that a number of director characteristics such as 
prior experience, financial expertise, other commitments, and independence from the CEO are 
related to directors’ supervisory and disciplinary capacity (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Güner 
et al., 2008; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Coles et al., 2014; Field and 
Mkrtchyan, 2017). However, the evidence on whether director compensation mitigates or 
reinforces barriers to objective monitoring is still scant, which is perhaps surprising given the 
voluminous evidence in the CEO compensation literature that monetary incentives can affect 
managerial behavior. Notable exceptions are the studies of Brick et al. (2006) and Bebchuk et 
al. (2010) that show that abnormal compensation of directors coinciding with that of the CEO 
is associated with firm underperformance, reflecting agency problems due to CEO-director 
reciprocity, so called cronyism.  
In this paper, we shed new light on the relation between director abnormal compensation1 
and the quality of the board’s decisions. Specifically, we examine the quality of the board’s 
decision to retain or fire the CEO. We focus on this decision because it is one of the board’s 
primary responsibilities, and a decision that lies at the heart of the debate on the costs of 
managerial entrenchment. 2  Further, we investigate whether the presence of institutional 
                                                          
1 The variable of interest in the paper, a proxy for cronyism, is the predicted component of CEO (director) 
compensation that is due to residual director (CEO) compensation, calculated following the methodology of Brick 
et al. (2006, p.420). It represents the proportion of CEO (director) compensation predicted by the director (CEO) 
compensation variable in excess of the controls for the standard economic determinants of compensation. 
Throughout the paper, this variable is referred to as ‘CEO (director) abnormal compensation’ for the sake of brevity.  
2 Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that one way to evaluate the board’s effectiveness is to assess the quality 
of CEO turnover decisions. Similarly, Hermalin (2005) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) argue that among the few 
corporate decisions for which the board plays a significant role, the most common, and arguably among the most 
important ones, are those decisions pertaining to the selection, monitoring, and retention or dismissal of the CEO. 
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investors, and thus the existence of an important external governance mechanism, helps 
mitigate the effects of abnormal compensation. 
In theory, the board of directors acts as a constraint on the CEO’s ability to deviate from 
the maximization of shareholder value. However, in practice directors might be subject to 
agency problems, which would undermine their ability to monitor management effectively. 
Indeed, directors may have incentives to side with the CEO, as the latter plays an important role 
in their nomination process (Mace, 1986; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999).3 At the very least, CEOs approve, if not choose, the slate of directors and this slate is 
rarely challenged by shareholders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Coles et al., 2014). Thus, 
catering to the wishes of the CEO could increase the likelihood that a director will be re-
appointed, which ultimately results in substantial CEO and managerial power. Relatedly, 
directors, regardless of whether they are independent in the conventional and legal sense, likely 
assign their allegiance to the CEO especially if they have personal ties with the latter (Hwang 
and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Hallock, 1997)4 or have been appointed by the CEO 
(Coles et al., 2014), which undermines their ability to perform their monitoring role.  
As the CEO becomes powerful within the firm, he acquires a great deal of control over 
his board and this control includes his influence on the process whereby CEO compensation 
and director compensation are determined (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Bebchuk et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, to the extent that the CEO can provide benefits to the directors via, e.g., higher 
compensation, taking actions against the CEO increases the likelihood that the directors will 
forego these benefits, making them more reluctant to take such actions. In other words, here 
                                                          
3 Corporate law states that shareholders choose the board of directors. However, as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
note, in practice, shareholders almost always vote for the slate proposed by management. As a result, CEOs have 
a great deal of influence on how the slate is determined, and in turn the process whereby directors are appointed. 
Mace (1986) and Lorsch and MacIver (1989) provide case-study evidence that CEOs play an important role in 
selecting new board members. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that CEO involvement in the selection of new 
board members decreases the firm’s subsequent number of independent directors. 
4 Hwang and Kim (2009) and Fracassi and Tate (2012) show that social ties between the directors and the CEO 
undermine directors’ effectiveness with respect to their disciplinary and monitoring functions. Hwang and Kim 
(2009) find that such ties increase CEO fixed pay and reduce CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
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director abnormal compensation can be thought of as capturing the disutility to directors from 
monitoring the CEO, and in turn what the CEO can get away with. Therefore, we expect that 
CEOs at firms with higher director abnormal compensation are less likely to be dismissed 
following poor performance.  
We begin the analysis by showing that CEO compensation and director compensation are 
positively related and that this positive relation is associated with subsequent firm 
underperformance, consistent with Brick et al. (2006). We then investigate the relation between 
CEO turnover decisions and director abnormal compensation. We find that CEO turnover is 
insensitive to good stock performance (i.e., a positive firm stock return adjusted by the market 
return), but it is highly sensitive to poor stock performance (i.e., a negative firm stock return 
adjusted by the market return). More importantly, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock 
performance is significantly reduced by director abnormal compensation, suggesting that CEOs 
at firms with higher director abnormal compensation are less likely to be dismissed for 
underperformance. This finding is in line with the cronyism hypothesis: the CEO uses his or 
her power to help directors acquire higher compensation in exchange for the latter’s loyalty and 
for the CEO to avoid being replaced in the wake of bad performance. 
Having established an association between abnormal compensation on the one side and 
future firm performance and CEO turnover on the other, we next explore whether the effects of 
abnormal compensation vary across firms with different levels of institutional holdings. 
Institutional investors should reduce the extent to which board actions can deviate from the 
interests of shareholders because there are costs to the directors and CEO from outsiders’ 
recognition of and reaction to managerial rent extraction. It has been well-documented that 
institutional investors are effective monitors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gillan, 2006) whose 
presence is associated with higher firm value (McConnell and Servaes, 1990), higher pay-
performance sensitivity and lower levels of compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 2003), and more 
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monitoring (Brickley et al., 1988).5 Therefore, to the extent that cronyism reflects agency issues 
and that effective monitoring by institutional investors mitigates such issues, the effects of 
abnormal compensation on firm performance and CEO turnover should be weakened by the 
presence of institutional investors. 
Our findings are consistent with this prediction. First, we find that institutional ownership 
mitigates not only the positive relation between director compensation and CEO cash 
compensation but also the negative relation between director abnormal compensation and CEO 
turnover. Second, director abnormal compensation lowers the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
poor stock performance in firms with low, but not high, levels of institutional holdings. Third, 
institutional ownership reduces the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm 
performance. Taken together, these findings suggest that institutional investors moderate 
executive compensation, and enhance the threat of dismissal, thereby mitigating the negative 
impact of agency problems on firm performance. These findings provide further support for the 
cronyism hypothesis. Finally, we find that firms with higher director abnormal compensation 
are more likely to engage in earnings management and that this effect is reduced by institutional 
ownership. This further confirms the cronyism hypothesis. 
Our paper makes the following major contributions to the literature. First, the study most 
closely related to ours is Brick et al. (2006), which shows that abnormal compensation of 
directors and CEOs and the resulting firm underperformance over the following year are likely 
reflective of the board culture problem they refer to as cronyism. Our findings extend this line 
of enquiry by uncovering how cronyism affects a key function of the board: boards with 
                                                          
5  The existing literature has established two primary channels through which institutional investors exert 
governance and mitigate agency issues. The first channel is direct intervention in a firm, otherwise known as 
“voice.” For instance, Crane et al. (2016) show that greater institutional ownership leads firms to pay more 
dividends. Moreover, their results on shareholder proposals and proxy voting behavior are consistent with 
institutions assuming a monitoring role and pushing for higher dividends through shareholder proposals and voting. 
The second channel is selling one’s shares if the manager underperforms, otherwise known as “exit” (Edmans and 
Manso, 2011). 
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abnormal compensation are associated with suboptimal CEO turnover decisions, thereby 
weakening internal governance. Our results also complement theirs by providing evidence that 
this problem exists in the UK where CEOs and other directors are much less likely to be 
entrenched. There are at least two reasons why entrenchment is less severe in the UK. First, 
CEO-chair duality is the exception rather than the norm: Mira et al. (2018) find that in only 15% 
of their sample there is CEO-chair duality. Similarly, Fernandes et al. (2013) show that for the 
year 2005, 5% of the CEOs of UK firms are also the Chairman of the board.  This compares to 
54% and 64% in the US samples of Fernandes et al. (2013) and Duru et al. (2013), respectively, 
and 75% of the S&P 500 firms in 2003 studied by Chhaochharia and Grindstein (2007). Second, 
unlike the US where most companies have staggered boards to limit director change (see e.g., 
Duru et al., 2013, who find that 61% of their sample firms have staggered boards), in the UK 
there are no restrictions to CEO and director turnover. Hence, one would expect cronyism not 
to exist in the UK. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence of cronyism. 
Second, our paper adds to the literature on the relation between CEO turnover and various 
board/director attributes. A number of studies find that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity 
is significantly lower when the directors are busy (i.e., they hold three or more directorships) 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), when they share social ties with the CEO (Hwang and Kim, 2009), 
and when the board consists of a majority of inside directors (Guo and Masulis, 2015) or 
directors appointed after the CEO assumed office (Coles et al., 2014). Our results complement 
previous work in this line of inquiry by suggesting another factor influencing CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity, i.e., director abnormal compensation. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on whether institutional investors monitor their 
investee firms. Denis et al. (1997) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) provide evidence that institutional 
ownership enhances the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Our paper adopts a 
different angle: We hypothesize and show that institutional ownership reduces the negative 
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effect of director abnormal compensation on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. This 
finding implies that the directors’ concerns for violating the normative expectations imposed 
by institutional investors may reduce their incentives to pursue private benefits, while making 
them more likely to monitor and discipline the CEO.  
Finally, our study highlights the importance of compensation packages of directors in 
shaping the latter’s incentives and ensuring the well-functioning of the board. Policies and 
practices that improve the transparency of the process whereby directors’ remuneration 
packages are designed strengthen the alignment of interests between directors and shareholders, 
and consequently promote boardroom dynamics that support the firm’s long-term success. 
Consistent with this view, in 2013 the UK government implemented directors’ remuneration 
reforms that require that the directors’ remuneration report of listed firms must include details 
of both payments/benefits received by the directors in the financial year being reported on and 
future director remuneration policy, and that the remuneration policy must be approved by an 
ordinary resolution of the shareholders at least every three years.6 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
explains the model. Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Model specification and data 
2.1. Determinants of compensation 
A long-standing literature addresses the determinants of managerial compensation. To measure 
director (CEO) abnormal compensation, we estimate regressions whose dependent variable is 
the cash and total compensation of directors (the CEO). The independent variables include firm, 
executive, and governance characteristics that have been used in previous studies.  
                                                          
6 See the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) report on directors’ remuneration reforms, released 
on March 18, 2013. Details are available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/directors-remuneration-reforms-frequently-asked-questions. 
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Firm size typically accounts for the largest proportion of variation in executive 
compensation (Murphy, 1999). Managing large firms requires more effort and managerial 
expertise because of the increased complexity of investment and operating decisions. Thus, 
large firms use higher levels of compensation to attract more talented executives. We measure 
firm size as the logarithm of sales. 
We include Tobin’s q to account for growth opportunities. Smith and Watts (1992) find 
that the larger the proportion of firm value represented by growth opportunities, the more 
closely managers’ compensation is tied to firm value, and the greater the variance of their 
compensation. To compensate for the additional risk, higher pay is required. Similarly, both 
leverage and stock return volatility increase the riskiness of equity-based compensation and 
thus should be associated with higher compensation (Fernandes et al., 2013).  
A central prediction of agency theory is a positive link between compensation and 
performance (Holmström, 1979; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). We include both market (stock 
return) and operating (return on assets) measures as indicators of directors’ prior performance. 
In addition, firms with more tangible assets may have lower agency costs because such assets 
are easier to monitor (Himmelberg et al., 1999). Thus, we expect a negative relation between 
firm tangibility, measured as the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets 
(PPE t-1/TA t-1), and total compensation. All of the above firm characteristics are lagged by one 
year relative to the dependent variable to mitigate potential endogeneity. Detailed definitions 
are shown in Appendix A. To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize all of the above 
variables at the first and 99th percentiles. 
Moreover, we include both Insider ownership 7  and Total institutional ownership to 
account for the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation. Greater insider 
ownership is associated with lower compensation (Fernandes et al., 2013). Intense monitoring 
                                                          
7 Insiders are defined as shareholders who hold at least 5% of the outstanding shares such as officers and directors 
and their immediate families, other corporations, and individuals. 
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by institutional investors may exert pressure on the executives. To the extent that such pressure 
lowers utility, executives demand higher pay to compensate for the utility loss (Hermalin, 2005).  
We also control for board characteristics. First, both large boards (Yermack, 1996) and 
busy boards (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) are associated with lower monitoring effectiveness, 
and thus higher compensation. We measure board busyness as the ratio of the number of current 
board positions held by all the directors on the board to board size (Current board positions). 
Second, the more independent the board, the greater is the monitoring of the executives and the 
higher is the latter’s compensation for disutility (Hermalin, 2005). We measure board 
independence as the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. Third, CEO 
Chairman is a dummy that equals one if the CEO is also the Chairman, and zero otherwise.  
Our final set of controls is CEO and director characteristics. Note that these variables are 
at the individual CEO or director level. Age is the age of the CEO or director in years, which 
might impact human capital risk and in turn executive compensation. Tenure is the CEO’s or 
director’s time in position in years. The relation between tenure and director compensation is 
expected to be ambiguous (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). On the one hand, directors with longer 
tenure are more likely to be entrenched and powerful, which could lead to higher compensation. 
On the other hand, such directors might have greater share ownership from previous equity 
grants due to their longer tenure, thereby aligning their interests with those of the shareholders. 
External is a dummy that equals one if the CEO or director was hired from outside the firm, 
and zero otherwise. Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) document that directors hired from outside 
the firm earn significantly more than those promoted internally. They interpret this finding as 
evidence for the relative importance of general over firm-specific managerial ability.8 
                                                          
8 Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) define general managerial ability as managerial skills that are valuable to all 
companies, e.g., financial and accounting expertise and management skills. In contrast, firm-specific managerial 
capital refers to skills, experience and knowledge valuable only to the specific organization, e.g., connections with 
colleagues and clients and familiarity with the culture and regulations of a specific company. 
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Although we control for many firm characteristics, it is inevitable that other unobserved 
firm characteristics, such as corporate culture, investment strategies and the demand for unique 
management skills, also impact compensation. Thus, we use firm-fixed effects regressions to 
account for the firms’ latent traits.9  One advantage of the fixed effects method is that it 
generates parameters on observed firm characteristics that are not affected by omitted variable 
bias as long as the omitted variables are time-invariant (Graham et al., 2012). For example, 
Graham et al. (2012) show that the effect of firm size on executive compensation declines 
significantly after controlling for firm-fixed effects, suggesting that the size effect is likely 
overstated when the time-invariant unobservables are not properly accounted for. In addition, 
we use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to compute the t-statistics. 
 
2.2. Data sources and description 
Our dataset is obtained from three different sources. First, the CEO and director compensation 
data is obtained from BoardEx. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonuses. Equity-
based compensation includes stock awards, long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and options.10 
Total compensation is the sum of cash and equity-based compensation. Second, institutional 
ownership data is obtained from Thomson One Banker. Third, data on other firm-specific 
controls is collected from Datastream.  
An issue with the compensation data arises from the fact that new executives assume 
office at different times during their first fiscal year. Thus, reported compensation may be 
affected by a timing problem. Furthermore, the extent of this timing problem varies with the 
type of new executive. The reported salary/bonus for internally promoted executives is the 
amount earned over the entire fiscal year. Although the figure does not represent only pay 
                                                          
9 The Hausman test rejects the use of a random effects model. 
10 The value of LTIPs is set to be the value obtainable on the grant date. Stock option value is calculated by using 
the Black-Scholes model based on the vesting period and it is therefore the estimated value of the options awarded, 
as opposed to their intrinsic value. Compensation data is in constant 2005 pounds. 
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earned after the change in position, the magnitude of the timing problem for internal 
replacements should be much less than that for external replacements (Chang et al., 2016). To 
eliminate the timing problem and ensure the robustness of the test results, we exclude new 
executives (i.e., those with tenure of less than one year). As a result, the final sample consists 
of 19,291 CEO/director-year observations from 1,294 UK-listed non-financial firms over the 
period 1998-2009.11 We use the logarithm of compensation for regression purposes because the 
compensation data is skewed. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the level of managerial compensation and the 
main explanatory variables. Compared with the US sample used by Brick et al. (2006), the 
sample in this paper includes firms of a similar size (average sales are £1,650 million, compared 
with the average of $2,884 million reported by Brick et al.), with similar growth opportunities 
(the average Tobin’s q is 1.980, compared with the 1.848 reported by Brick et al.) and stock 
return volatility (0.403 compared with 0.386).  
  Insert Table 1 about here 
For the ownership structure and board composition variables, we note first that the sample 
firms have average insider ownership of 27.1%, compared with 32.0% in Fernandes et al. (2013) 
for a sample of non-US firms. The mean fraction of independent directors is 38.2%, compared 
with 51.5% reported by Conyon et al. (2018) for UK firms. The boards have eight members on 
average, compared with an average of nine members reported by Ozkan (2007) for UK firms.  
Moreover, 11.3% of the CEOs in our sample also chair their board. This is comparable 
with the 16.0% reported by Fernandes et al. (2013) for non-US firms but is much less than the 
53.6% reported for US firms.  
                                                          
11 We exclude financial companies for the following reasons: i) they tend to have special asset compositions and 
are subject to relatively stricter regulation compared to non-financial companies; and ii) Tobin’s q cannot be 
compared across financial and non-financial companies (Ozkan, 2012). 
 
11 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1. CEO compensation, director compensation and firm performance: Replicating past 
findings  
We begin by modeling the logarithm of cash and total compensation for both individual 
directors and the CEO in Table 2. Consistent with prior studies (Ozkan, 2007; Fernandes et al., 
2013), we find that executive compensation is positively related to LnSalest-1, Stock return, 
Total institutional ownership, Fraction of independent directors, and Board size, and negatively 
related to PPE t-1/TA t-1 and Insider ownership.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
We then examine the impact of director compensation on the logarithm of CEO cash and 
total compensation by including Residual director total compensation as an additional 
explanatory variable. Residual director total compensation is defined as the sum of the residual 
compensation of all (non-CEO) board members in the firm, where residual compensation is the 
residual in the director total compensation regression, i.e., model 2 of Table 2. The results are 
presented in Table 3. As in Brick et al. (2006), the estimated coefficients on Residual director 
total compensation are significantly positive, suggesting that CEO compensation increases with 
director compensation. In terms of economic significance, the results in models 1 and 2 indicate 
that if Residual director total compensation increases from 0 to 0.1, i.e., total abnormal 
compensation increases by £47,140 per year for the directors, 12  CEO cash compensation 
increases by 1.06% and total compensation increases by 3.09% relative to the mean levels. 
                                                          
12 The average total compensation for the directors in our sample (in inflation-adjusted 2005 pounds) is £495,359 
(Table 1). At this level, residual log compensation of 0.1 translates into abnormal compensation of £47,140 
(£495,359 × (1 – 1 / exp(0.1))), or roughly 10% of compensation. 
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These increases correspond to approximately £4,673 cash and £27,095 total compensation 
annually for the CEO. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
A potential concern with the interpretation of the results shown in Table 3 is that the effect 
captured by Residual director total compensation might simply be due to board size. To address 
this concern, we find in an untabulated analysis that the results are robust to alternative 
definitions of the residual director compensation variable, namely, i) the average (instead of the 
sum) of the residual compensation of all directors on the board, and ii) the fraction of 
excessively paid directors, where excessively paid directors are those with positive residuals 
from the director total compensation regression (model 2 of Table 2). 
Finally, we examine the relation between abnormal compensation and firm performance. 
Following Brick et al. (2006), we measure cronyism as the difference between fitted CEO 
compensation without director compensation and fitted CEO compensation with director 
compensation: 
𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑋?̂?1                                          
𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐷𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑋?̂?2 + 𝑍?̂?                                      
CEO_DUE_TO_DIR = 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐷𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 −   
 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
where X is the matrix of data used in the first CEO total compensation regression. ?̂?1 represents 
the vector of the estimated coefficients of model 4, Table 2, which does not include director 
compensation as an explanatory variable. ?̂?2 represents the vector of the estimated coefficients 
of model 2, Table 3, which includes the director compensation variable. Z is the matrix of the 
director compensation variable, and 𝛿 denotes the vector of its estimated coefficients. 
CEO_DUE_TO_DIR represents the incremental proportion of CEO compensation due to 
higher director compensation. It is calculated as the difference between the fitted CEO 
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compensation regression with (from model 2, Table 3) and that without (from model 4, Table 
2) director compensation as an explanatory variable. CEO_DUE_TO_DIR can be considered a 
measure of abnormal compensation, because it captures the part of CEO compensation due to 
higher director compensation, in excess of the controls for the standard determinants of 
compensation. Likewise, DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the incremental proportion of director 
compensation due to higher CEO compensation. It is calculated as the difference between fitted 
director compensation with (from an untabulated regression) and that without (from model 2, 
Table 2) CEO compensation as an explanatory variable. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics for the governance characteristics for the firms in 
the highest and lowest quintiles based on the estimated CEO and director abnormal 
compensation. The differences in means between the highest and lowest quintiles, along with 
the significance levels, are also reported. Consistent with Brick et al. (2006), we find some 
evidence that high abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is less likely observed in 
firms with greater institutional ownership and those with a higher fraction of independent 
directors since the presence of institutional investors and that of independent directors may 
mitigate the agency problems in the boardroom. 
In addition, we relate the estimated abnormal compensation variables to the three CEO 
characteristics known to capture managerial entrenchment and governance quality. First, 
Tenure is the number of years the CEO has been in the post. The CEO’s ability to deviate from 
shareholder value maximization may vary over his time in office. As the CEO becomes more 
influential in the firm over time, he will have more sway over his board and will be better able 
to engage in rent-seeking activities (Pan et al., 2016). Second, CPS (CEO pay slice) is defined 
as the percentage of the total compensation of the top five executives that is paid to the CEO. 
It is a measure of the relative importance of the CEO in the top executive team. Bebchuk et al. 
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(2011) show that a greater CPS is associated with lower accounting profitability, lower firm 
value, lower acquisition announcement returns, a higher likelihood of the CEO receiving a 
lucky options grant, i.e., an options grant at the lowest price of the month, and lower 
performance sensitivity of CEO turnover. They interpret these findings as evidence that a 
greater CPS is indicative of agency problems. Third, CEO-director tie is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the CEO has at least one network tie with the other directors through past work 
experience or past educational institutions, and zero otherwise. 13  The CEO’s internal 
connectedness through network ties may enable the CEO to gain automatic support from the 
directors, thereby facilitating rent extraction.  
The results indicate that firms with high abnormal CEO and/or director compensation are 
more likely to have a CEO with longer tenure, with a greater CPS, and with connections to the 
other directors through network ties.14 All these findings suggest that poor governance is more 
likely to exist in firms that provide abnormal compensation to their CEO and directors, 
consistent with the notion that abnormal compensation reflects agency problems. 
Table 5 presents the results for the relation between abnormal compensation and firm 
performance/valuation over the following year. We use the below specifications: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂_𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝛼2𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 1 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂_𝐷𝐼𝑅 + 𝜃2𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 2 
The dependent variables include Industry-adj. Tobin’s q (Industry-adj. ROA), which is 
the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q (ROA) and the mean value for all firms in the same 
Fama-French industry, and Abnormal return, which is the annual abnormal returns derived 
                                                          
13 The data on network ties is obtained from BoardEx. The two types of ties considered include overlaps in past 
employment (working as an employee for the same firm or serving on the same board) and those in past education. 
Only network ties established during overlapping years are included. Further, to avoid reverse causality, we include 
only network ties developed prior to the CEO and the directors joining the firm. 
14 The results are qualitatively similar when the cronyism variables are calculated based on cash compensation and 
equity compensation separately. Interestingly, the results seem to suggest that poor governance practices are more 
likely to exist in firms with abnormal cash compensation than in firms with abnormal equity compensation. 
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from the three-factor Fama-French model.15  Overall, we find a negative relation between 
CEO/director abnormal compensation and firm performance, consistent with the view that 
abnormal compensation is symptomatic of agency problems.16 Further, the observation that the 
negative relation is typically statistically significant after controlling for CPS and CEO-director 
tie suggests that our abnormal compensation variables likely capture unexplored dimensions of 
agency issues that cannot be explained by the CEO’s dominance in the firm or his 
connectedness to the board.  
Lending further confidence to the validity of the findings, we confirm in untabulated 
analysis that controlling for additional board characteristics, namely, the fraction of 
independent directors and the fraction of directors with three or more directorships, has little 
impact on our results. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
                                                          
15 The abnormal returns are estimated using the following three-factor model, 
Ri,t - rft = αi + βMKTi MKTt  + βSMBi SMBt + βHMLi HMLt + εi,t, 
where Ri,t is the return of firm i in month t, and rft is the monthly return on the three-month UK Treasury Bills. 
MKTt is the excess return of the UK FTSE All Share index, SMB is the Small-Minus-Big (SMB) size factor, HML 
is the High-Minus-Low (HML) value factor. Firm i’s expected return in month t is calculated as the sum of the 
estimated intercept and the products of factor loadings, estimated using 60-month rolling windows, and realizations 
of the three factors in that month. The abnormal return in month t is the difference between the firm’s actual stock 
return and its estimated expected return. Annual abnormal returns are then the aggregated buy-and-hold returns 
using the monthly abnormal returns over the past year. Data on the three factors for the UK is from Gregory et al. 
(2013) and is available at:  
http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/xfi/famafrench/files/. 
16 A potential alternative explanation for the observed lower returns for firms with higher abnormal compensation 
is that such firms are associated with lower systematic risk. We argue that this is highly unlikely for mainly two 
reasons. First, the risk associated with abnormal compensation is related to agency problems within the firm and 
thus is idiosyncratic. Second, for each year, we divide the sample firms into quintiles based on 
CEO_DUE_TO_DIR (DIR_DUE_TO_CEO) and track their subsequent annual stock returns. If lower returns for 
firms with higher abnormal compensation are due to lower systematic risk, then the difference in stock returns 
between the top and bottom quintiles should persist over time (Chambers et al., 2002; Lev et al., 2009). In 
untabulated results, we find that the difference in stock returns does not persist and that it tends to reduce to zero 
in the fifth year after portfolio formation. This observation is consistent with the view that the market 
underestimates the negative impact of poor governance and that this underestimation disappears over time. 
According to Edmans (2011), this correction can take about five years, which our data confirms. 
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3.2. Abnormal compensation and CEO turnover 
To provide further support for the cronyism hypothesis, we examine whether abnormal 
compensation reduces the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Given that firms with high abnormal 
compensation exhibit underperformance, it should be expected that the CEOs of such firms are 
more likely to be replaced, unless the abnormal compensation is at least partly due to agency 
problems associated with cronyism. Higher compensation of directors strengthens their loyalty 
to the CEO, making the CEO’s position more secure, irrespective of his performance.  
We construct two indicators of CEO turnover. Overall turnover is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the CEO for firm i in year t-1 is not the same as in year t, and zero otherwise. 
We then distinguish between forced and voluntary turnover, following the classification of 
Parrino (1997), frequently used in CEO turnover studies (e.g., Peters and Wagner, 2014; Guo 
and Masulis, 2015; Jenter and Lewellen, 2010; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). Specifically, our 
second indicator, Forced turnover, equals one, if (1) news articles report that the CEO has been 
fired, forced out, or retires or resigns due to policy differences or pressure; (2) the CEO is under 
the age of 60 and news articles do not report the reason for the departure as death, poor health, 
or the acceptance of another comparable position (within the firm or elsewhere); or (3) news 
articles report that the CEO is retiring but the retirement is not announced at least six months 
before the succession, and zero otherwise. Finally, cases classified as forced are reclassified as 
voluntary if news sources convincingly indicate that the departure is due to reasons unrelated 
to the firm’s activities. We search the Lexis-Nexis database to collect the information needed 
for this classification. Ultimately, our sample includes 816 cases of CEO turnover of which 356 
are classified as forced. 
Table 6 reports the results for the logit regressions on overall and forced CEO turnover. 
The regressions are of the form: 
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𝑙𝑛[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟)/(1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟))]
=  𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂_𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝜇2𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 3 
The variable of interest is DIR_DUE_TO_CEO. Following prior studies, we control for 
potential determinants of CEO turnover, including the firm-specific return, market return, CPS, 
CEO internal connectedness, board size, board independence, CEO tenure dummies,17 age, and 
the CEO Chairman indicator. In particular, Firm-specific return is defined as the difference 
between the firm’s stock return and Market return, 18 where Market return is the return on the 
FTSE All Share index.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
The results are consistent with the cronyism hypothesis. The coefficient on 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO in model 1 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (z-
statistic = -2.98). 19  The higher the director compensation due to the CEO compensation 
variable, the less likely the directors are to dismiss the CEO. In terms of economic significance, 
the coefficient on DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is -0.185, suggesting that with a 0.1 increase in 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO (or approximately half of a standard deviation),20  the CEO turnover 
                                                          
17 Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we use categorical values for CEO tenure to account for the possibility that 
the effect of tenure on CEO turnover might not be monotonic. In untabulated results, we find that the use of tenure 
as a continuous variable does not materially change the results. 
18 The use of relative performance measures can be justified via both Holmström (1982) and Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990). They argue that relative performance evaluation (RPE) is valuable if agents face some common 
uncertainties because RPE can provide incentives, while partially insulating agents from common uncertainties. 
Furthermore, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) argue that CEO performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to 
aggregate market movements than to industry movements. Warner et al. (1988) provide evidence that market-
adjusted stock returns are a better predictor of CEO dismissals than absolute performance. Accordingly, we 
measure firm-specific performance as the difference between the firm stock return and the market return (FTSE 
All Share index return) over the year prior to the CEO turnover. We use the absolute performance measure, namely 
the firm stock return, as a robustness check and find that the results do not change qualitatively. 
19 To address the issue that the main independent variables of interest (the residual director compensation variable 
as well as CEO_DUE_TO_DIR and DIR_DUE_TO_CEO) are derived from fitting regressions, we use the adjusted 
standard errors of the regression coefficients, i.e., the Murphy-Topel standard error calculated following Hole’s 
(2006) approach and the bootstrap standard error. The results obtained using the adjusted standard errors are similar 
to those reported above. 
20 DIR_DUE_TO_CEO has a standard deviation of 0.224 and CEO_DUE_TO_DIR has a standard deviation of 
0.247. 
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probability decreases by approximately 2% (exp (–0.185 × 0.1) – 1). Model 2 shows that the 
coefficient on DIR_DUE_TO_CEO remains negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level (z-statistic = -2.01) after controlling for the CEO’s internal dominance (CPS) and 
connectedness (CEO-director tie). Moreover, and as expected, the relation between the firm-
specific return and CEO turnover is negative and significant: CEOs who perform poorly relative 
to the market are more likely to be replaced. In models 3 and 4, we perform the same exercise 
for Forced turnover and find the same patterns.  
As a supplementary analysis (untabulated), we examine whether CEO_DUE_TO_DIR 
affects CEO turnover decisions. We do not find evidence that CEO compensation due to 
directors has a significant impact on CEO dismissal. Thus, in subsequent analyses we focus on 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, which is also the focus of our hypotheses. 
In Table 7, we examine whether directors with higher abnormal compensation are less 
likely to dismiss the CEO, despite poor performance. To test this, we estimate the following 
logit regression: 
𝑙𝑛[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟)/(1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟))]
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 × 𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂_𝐶𝐸𝑂
+  𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂_𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 4 
In model 1, where the dependent variable is Overall turnover, the coefficient on Firm-specific 
return is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level and the coefficient on the 
interaction between Firm-specific return and DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is insignificant. However, 
the latter coefficient becomes significant and positive in model 3 where Forced turnover is used, 
providing support for the argument that director abnormal compensation reduces CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
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We then split the firm-specific return into positive and negative returns in models 2 and 
4. The representative specification is: 
𝑙𝑛[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟)/(1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟))]
=  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 × 𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂_𝐶𝐸𝑂
+ 𝛾2𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 × 𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂_𝐶𝐸𝑂
+  𝛾3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛾4𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
+ 𝛾5𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝐸_𝑇𝑂_𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 𝛾6𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 5 
The positive (negative) firm-specific return is equal to the firm-specific return if the latter is 
positive (negative), and zero otherwise. We find that the CEO is more likely to be replaced after 
bad (but not good) performance relative to the market return. However, the positive coefficient 
on the interaction with Negative firm-specific return (i.e., Negative firm-specific return × 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO) counters the negative baseline link between stock performance and CEO 
turnover. Thus, whereas CEOs are normally penalized for poor performance, CEOs in firms 
with higher director abnormal compensation are less likely to be dismissed for poor 
performance, consistent with the cronyism hypothesis. As a robustness check (not tabulated), 
we repeat the tests in Tables 6 and 7 incorporating the fraction of directors with three or more 
directorships as an additional control. The results are not materially affected. 
 
3.3. The impact of institutional investors 
The results thus far indicate that abnormal compensation is associated with weaker 
governance, as evidenced by subsequent underperformance and a lower sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to poor performance, consistent with the cronyism hypothesis. Yet, this is not the 
whole story. Although agency problems that reduce the monitoring effectiveness of the board 
may exist, the firm should still be able to rely on the external monitoring by institutional 
investors. Previous studies stress the role of institutional investors in monitoring their investee 
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firms and improving firm performance (Denis et al., 1997; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Brickley 
et al., 1988). To shed further light on the cronyism hypothesis, we examine whether institutional 
investor presence, as proxied by Total institutional ownership, influences the effects of 
abnormal compensation shown in the previous tables. If abnormal compensation is associated 
with agency issues, then institutional ownership may mitigate the corresponding effects of 
abnormal compensation. 
We conduct three sets of tests to examine whether institutional investors help mitigate 
agency issues in the boardroom. First, we analyze the effect of institutional ownership on the 
relation between director compensation and CEO compensation. We expect institutional 
ownership to weaken this relation. Table 8 presents the results of the regressions that include 
the interaction term between Total institutional ownership and Residual director total 
compensation. Consistent with the cronyism hypothesis, we find that the positive relation 
between director compensation and CEO cash compensation is mitigated by institutional 
ownership. The coefficient on the interaction term in model 1 is statistically significant at the 
5% level (t-statistic = -2.41) and has the opposite sign of the coefficient on Residual director 
total compensation. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient on Residual director 
total compensation suggests that if Residual director total compensation increases by 0.1, i.e., 
an increase in total abnormal compensation of £47,140 per year for directors, CEO cash 
compensation increases by £6,965 or by 1.58% from its mean value. Moreover, the coefficient 
on the interaction term between Residual director total compensation and Total institutional 
ownership is -0.093, implying that with 50% institutional ownership, the sensitivity of CEO 
cash compensation to Residual director total compensation is reduced by approximately one-
third. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
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Nevertheless, the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant in model 2, where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of CEO total compensation. Institutional monitoring 
appears only to reduce the impact of director compensation on CEO cash compensation, 
implying that institutional investors are more concerned with the proportion of CEO 
compensation that is less performance contingent.    
Second, we explore whether institutional ownership changes the relation between director 
abnormal compensation and CEO turnover. For firms with high institutional ownership, it is 
more difficult for the CEO to influence director compensation to reduce board scrutiny. The 
pressure and constraints imposed by institutional investors reduce directors’ incentives to 
pursue their own interests at the detriment of shareholder interests. We thus expect institutional 
ownership to weaken the relation between director abnormal compensation and CEO turnover. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
To test this conjecture, we augment models 2 and 4 of Table 6 by including Total 
institutional ownership and its interaction with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO as an additional 
explanatory variable. Models 1 and 4 of Table 9 show the results for overall and forced CEO 
turnover, respectively, for the whole sample. Consistent with our prediction, the effect of 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO on CEO turnover is mitigated by Total institutional ownership. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant at the 10% level and has the 
opposite sign of the coefficient on DIR_DUE_TO_CEO in both models.  
In models 2 and 3, we examine whether director abnormal compensation has a differential 
effect on the performance sensitivity of overall CEO turnover across firms with high 
institutional ownership and those with low institutional ownership. In models 5 and 6, we repeat 
the exercise for forced CEO turnover, and distinguishing again between firms with high 
institutional ownership and those with low institutional ownership. A firm is included in the 
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high institutional ownership group if its institutional ownership is above the sample median; 
otherwise, it is included in the low institutional ownership group (see column title).  
Several observations can be made. The results suggest that the link between poor 
performance and CEO turnover is stronger (both in terms of significance and magnitude) in 
firms with high institutional ownership. This is not surprising given that CEOs of firms with 
high institutional ownership are likely subject to greater external monitoring and thus are more 
likely to be dismissed for poor performance. Further, the coefficient on the interaction between 
Negative firm-specific return and DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is positive, weakening the negative link 
between performance and CEO turnover. Importantly, the positive coefficient is only 
statistically significant for firms with low institutional ownership.21 This is consistent with the 
notion that the severity of agency problems – as reflected by both reduced overall and forced 
turnover in the wake of poor performance – decreases with institutional monitoring. 
Third, we investigate whether institutional ownership affects the relation between 
abnormal compensation and firm performance. Assuming institutional investors provide 
effective monitoring, we expect the negative relation between abnormal compensation and firm 
performance to be mitigated for firms with high levels of institutional ownership. Hence, we 
re-estimate the regressions in Table 5 for the subsamples with high and low levels of 
institutional ownership based on the sample median. The dependent variables are the three firm 
performance measures, i.e., Industry-adj. Tobin’s q, Industry-adj. ROA, and Abnormal return. 
The variables of interest are CEO_DUE_TO_DIR and DIR_DUE_TO_CEO. For the sake of 
simplicity, only the coefficients on the variables of interest are reported, while all other factors 
are controlled for in each model.  
Table 10 presents the regression results. Consistent with our prediction, we find that 
institutional investors weaken the negative effect of abnormal compensation on firm 
                                                          
21 The difference between the coefficients for the high and low institutional ownership groups is significant at the 
10% level. 
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performance. In models 4 to 6 where the low institutional ownership subsample is used, all 
three coefficient estimates on CEO_DUE_TO_DIR and all three coefficient estimates on 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO are negative, of which two each are statistically significant. In contrast, 
none of the coefficients in models 1 to 3 estimated using the high institutional ownership 
subsample is statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients estimated using the low 
institutional ownership subsample are larger in absolute value than those for the high 
institutional ownership group. To sum up Tables 9 and 10, we find that monitoring by 
institutional investors mitigates the effects of abnormal compensation on both CEO turnover 
and firm performance. In turn, these findings provide further evidence that abnormal 
compensation of the directors and the CEO is at least partly due to agency problems. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
3.4. Additional robustness checks and further analysis 
3.4.1 Additional robustness checks 
We undertake additional tests to ensure the robustness of the findings. First, we employ 
alternative model specifications for the CEO turnover regressions by adding Ln(Sales), 
Leverage, Stock return volatility as additional controls, following Gao et al. (2014). 
Untabulated results suggest that CEO turnover is more likely in larger firms and firms with high 
volatility, consistent with previous literature, and the main findings are unaffected. Second, we 
run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with industry and year effects, in addition to the 
firm-fixed effects estimations.22 The main findings continue to support the cronyism hypothesis. 
                                                          
22 Whereas firm-fixed effects account for time-invariant unobservables at the firm level, they also remove all 
between-firm variation from the data. This might jeopardize the results for variables with a cross-sectional feature 
(Zhou, 2001), such as Fraction of independent directors, Current board positions and Board size. Although 
substantially different across firms, those variables typically only change slowly from year to year within a firm. 
Untabulated results show that the above cross-sectional variables become highly significant at the 1% level or 
better across all OLS regressions. 
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3.4.2 Director abnormal compensation by board committee  
To further our understanding of the functioning of the board, we construct three 
alternative measures of director abnormal compensation based on board committee 
membership. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_AUD is defined as the proportion of compensation for 
directors serving on the audit committee that can be explained by the CEO compensation 
variable. Likewise, DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_COM (DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_NOM) is the proportion 
of compensation to directors sitting on the compensation (nomination) committee that can be 
explained by the CEO compensation variable. We obtain data on committee membership from 
BoardEx. One committee that is likely to be particularly important is the board’s nomination 
committee, given its role in determining the composition of the entire board, and the quality of 
directors and ultimately the effectiveness of internal governance (Guo and Masulis, 2015). In 
support of this view, we find in Tables 11 and 12 that the observed effects of director abnormal 
compensation on firm performance/value and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity are driven 
primarily by abnormal compensation of directors who sit on the nomination committee. 
Insert Table 11 about here 
Insert Table 12 about here 
On a related note, Guo and Masulis (2015) show that board and committee structure have 
distinct but complementary effects on board monitoring. Hence it is possible that our abnormal 
compensation variables are simply proxies for committee structure, which could be correlated 
with the quality of CEO turnover decisions and firm performance. To address this possibility, 
we confirm that our main results are not sensitive to controlling for four direct measures of 
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committee structure: 23  Nomination committee independence is the ratio of the number of 
independent directors to the total number of directors on the nomination committee; 
Compensation committee independence is the ratio of the number of independent directors to 
the total number of directors on the compensation committee; Audit committee independence is 
the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the audit 
committee; and CEO on committee is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is on the 
compensation committee or the nomination committee, and zero otherwise. 
 
3.4.3 Additional evidence from earnings management 
Our final set of tests investigates whether CEO and director abnormal compensation are 
also associated with higher levels of earnings management, as per the cronyism hypothesis.24 
To measure earnings management, we use discretionary accruals (DA) derived from the 
modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; and Dechow et al., 1995). Following prior studies, this 
measure is estimated using cross-sectional regressions of total accruals on changes in sales and 
on property, plant, and equipment (PPE) within industries.25 Table 13 presents the results. In 
models 1 and 2, where the key independent variables are the two abnormal compensation 
variables, we find that only DIR_DUE_TO_CEO has a significant and positive effect on DA. 
                                                          
23  The average percentage of independent directors is 97.2%, 96.1%, and 83.4% for the audit committee, 
compensation committee, and nomination committee, respectively. 
24 We also examine acquisition announcement returns but do not find evidence that CEO or director abnormal 
compensation has a significant impact on them. 
25 We construct this measure in two steps. First, we estimate the following cross-sectional model within each year 
and Fama-French 49 industry:  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑖,𝑡  (4) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes years. TAt denotes total accruals, defined as the change in non-cash current 
assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding the current proportion of long-term debt, minus depreciation 
and amortization for year t. Assetst-1 is total assets at the end of year t-1. ∆REVt is the change in sales from year t-1 
to t. PPEt is the gross value of plant, property and equipment at the end of year t. We require a minimum of 10 
observations for the estimation. Second, we use the estimated coefficients from equation (4) and the following 
model to compute the fitted normal accruals NAi,t: 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
  (5) 
where ∆ARi,t is the change in receivables. We subtract the change in receivables from the change in sales as credit 
sales might also be a potential source of accounting manipulation. Discretionary accruals are then computed as 
DAi,t = TAi,t / Assetsi,t-1 – NAi,t.  
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Adding the interaction term of DIR_DUE_TO_CEO with Total institutional ownership to 
model 3, we find that the coefficient on the interaction is negative and statistically significant, 
offsetting the positive baseline effect of DIR_DUE_TO_CEO. Taken together, while firms with 
higher director abnormal compensation are more likely to engage in earnings management, the 
presence of institutional investors mitigates this. These findings are again in line with the 
cronyism hypothesis, providing further support to the latter. 
Insert Table 13 about here 
4. Conclusion 
This paper tests the validity of the cronyism hypothesis, according to which correlated abnormal 
compensation of CEOs and directors is associated with agency problems, for the case of the 
UK. In the UK, CEOs and directors are much less likely to be entrenched than in the US. There 
are at least two reasons why this may be the case. First, successive codes of best practice in 
corporate governance have discouraged CEOs from acting as the Chairman of the board of 
directors. Hence, CEO duality is a rare occurrence in the UK. Second, staggered boards which 
are the norm in the US are unheard of in the UK. Hence, one would expect that the cronyism 
hypothesis does not apply to the UK. 
However, we find strong and consistent evidence in favor of the cronyism hypothesis 
for the UK. First, we show that firms with higher director abnormal compensation tend to 
exhibit lower firm performance/value, a reduced probability of CEO turnover, and weakened 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, suggesting that directors with higher abnormal 
compensation are less effective monitors. However, the observed impairment in monitoring 
effectiveness is alleviated by institutional investors as we find the negative relation between 
director abnormal compensation and CEO turnover to be less prominent when institutional 
ownership is high. In addition, in firms with high levels of institutional ownership, CEOs are 
less likely to avoid being replaced following poor performance, and the negative impact of 
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abnormal compensation on firm performance/value is less severe. Finally, further evidence 
from earnings management confirms the cronyism hypothesis. Firms with higher director 
abnormal compensation are more likely to engage in earnings management, especially when 
institutional ownership is low.  
Overall, our paper calls for reforms that enhance the disclosure of director compensation. 
Importantly, our results also suggest that the negative effects of director abnormal 
compensation on firm performance/value and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity are mainly 
driven by the levels of abnormal compensation of the members of the nomination committee. 
Hence, investors and regulators may want to give particular attention to the compensation levels 
of the members of this important board committee. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the main input variables. Director (CEO) cash compensation is the sum of 
salary and bonus for directors (CEO) in constant 2005 pounds. Director (CEO) total compensation is the sum of cash and 
equity compensation for directors (CEO) in constant 2005 pounds. We report summary statistics for the compensation 
variables in thousands of pounds. Sales is sales in constant 2005 pounds at the previous financial year end. We use its 
logarithmic transformation, LnSales, in all regressions. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets at the previous 
financial year end. Tobin’s q is total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets, 
at the previous financial year end. Stock return is the holding period stock return over the past year. Stock-return volatility 
is annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns over the past year. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITA) divided by total assets, at the previous financial year end. PPE/TA is the ratio of 
tangible assets (i.e., plant, property, and equipment) to total assets, at the previous financial year end. Insider ownership 
is the number of closely held shares by insiders as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding, where insiders are 
defined as shareholders who hold at least 5% of the outstanding shares. Total institutional ownership is institutional 
ownership by all institutional investors as a percentage of market capitalization. Board size is the number of executive 
and non-executive directors. Fraction of independent directors is the ratio of the number of independent directors to board 
size. CEO Chairman is a dummy that equals one if the CEO is also the Chairman, and zero otherwise. Current board 
positions is the ratio of the number of current board positions held by all directors on the board to board size. Age is the 
age of the CEO/director in years. Tenure is the number of years the CEO/director had been in position. External is a 
dummy equal to one if the CEO/director is hired from outside the firm, and zero otherwise. The sample consists of 19,291 
observations (including 5,769 CEO-year observations and 13,522 director-year observations) from 1,294 UK listed 
nonfinancial companies.  
 N Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
A. Executive compensation 
Director cash compensation (£000) 13,522 275.747 195.676 267.309 
Director equity compensation (£000) 13,522 219.611 33.355 851.922 
Director total compensation (£000) 13,522 495.359 252.301 980.998 
CEO cash compensation (£000) 5769 440.835 290.100 465.354 
CEO equity compensation (£000) 5769 436.021 41.230 1,960.714 
CEO total compensation (£000) 5769 876.856 384.648 2,216.208 
 
 
   
B. Determinants of executive compensation 
Sales t-1 (£000) 19,291 1,650,191 145,179 9,004,436 
Leverage t-1 19,291 0.189 0.163 0.174 
Tobin’s q t-1 19,291 1.980 1.473 1.607 
Stock return 19,291 0.141 0.077 0.530 
Stock-return volatility 19,291 0.403 0.342 0.234 
ROA t-1 19,291 0.076 0.119 0.216 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 19,291 0.285 0.211 0.252 
Insider ownership 19,291 0.271 0.238 0.218 
Total institutional ownership 19,291 0.501 0.525 0.274 
Board size 19,291 8.062 8.000 2.816 
Fraction of independent directors 19,291 0.382 0.400 0.181 
Current board positions 19,291 1.719 1.625 0.563 
CEO Chairman 19,291 0.113 0.000 0.314 
Age 19,291 49.995 50.000 7.588 
Tenure 19,291 5.692 3.900 5.026 
External 19,291 0.551 1.000 0.497 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. CEO and director compensation  
 
This table provides regression results on individual CEO and director compensation. The dependent variables are the logarithm of 
cash and total compensation in constant 2005 pounds. The control variables include: LnSales is the logarithm of sales in constant 
2005 pounds. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Tobin’s q is total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of 
equity divided by total assets. Stock return is the holding period stock return over the past year. Stock-return volatility is the 
annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for the past year. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITA) divided by total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (i.e., plant, property, and equipment) to total 
assets. Insider ownership is the number of closely held shares by insiders as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding, where 
insiders are defined as shareholders who hold at least 5% of the outstanding shares. Total institutional ownership is institutional 
ownership by all institutional investors as a percentage of market capitalization. Board size is the number of executive and non-
executive directors. Fraction of independent directors is the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. CEO 
Chairman is a dummy that equals one if the CEO is also the Chairman. Current board positions is the ratio of the number of current 
board positions held by all directors on the board to board size. Age is age of executives in years. Tenure is the number of years in 
position in the firm. External is a dummy equal to one if the executive is hired from outside the firm, and zero otherwise. t-statistics 
are based on robust standard error clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 Director compensation CEO compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnCash Lntotal LnCash Lntotal 
LnSales t-1 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 
 (3.78) (3.15) (3.07) (2.97) 
Leverage t-1 0.080 0.059 -0.103 -0.024 
 (1.27) (0.69) (-1.14) (-0.23) 
Tobin’s q t-1 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.012 
 (0.52) (1.17) (0.48) (1.26) 
Stock return  0.010 0.028* 0.015 0.016 
 (0.93) (1.66) (1.21) (0.81) 
Stock return volatility -0.163*** -0.199*** -0.138*** -0.170*** 
 (-4.75) (-4.14) (-3.72) (-3.16) 
ROA t-1 0.010 -0.074 0.062 0.001 
 (0.22) (-1.09) (1.25) (0.02) 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 -0.194** -0.288** -0.254** -0.323** 
 (-1.99) (-2.01) (-2.36) (-2.19) 
Insider ownership t-1 -0.146*** -0.214*** -0.095 -0.151* 
 (-2.96) (-3.07) (-1.56) (-1.89) 
Total institutional ownership t-1 0.076** 0.115* 0.174*** 0.208*** 
 (2.09) (1.94) (4.29) (3.40) 
Board size t-1 -0.001 0.001 0.022*** 0.027*** 
 (-0.12) (0.19) (3.29) (3.05) 
Fraction of independent directors t-1 0.193** 0.400*** 0.107 0.331*** 
 (2.51) (3.88) (1.44) (3.27) 
Current board positions t-1 0.040* 0.053* 0.026 0.028 
 (1.87) (1.75) (1.03) (0.83) 
CEO Chairman t-1 -0.038 -0.043 -0.091* -0.063 
 (-1.39) (-1.19) (-1.66) (-1.12) 
Age -0.003** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.011*** 
 (-2.09) (-4.91) (-1.42) (-3.58) 
Tenure 0.006*** 0.004** 0.005* 0.003 
 (3.07) (2.00) (1.68) (0.86) 
External  -0.021 -0.035** -0.022 -0.014 
 (-1.41) (-2.02) (-0.76) (-0.39) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13,522 13,522 5769 5769 
Adjusted R-sq 0.316 0.280 0.447 0.339 
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Table 3. The impact of director compensation on CEO compensation 
 
This table examines the impact of director compensation on CEO compensation. The dependent variables are the 
logarithm of CEO cash compensation in constant 2005 pounds and the logarithm of CEO total compensation in constant 
2005 pounds, respectively. The variable of interest is: Residual director total compensation, i.e., the sum of residuals in 
the director total compensation regression (model 2 Table 2) of all board members in a firm. Other control variables 
include the same firm, CEO and governance characteristics variables as in Table 2. t-statistics are based on robust standard 
error clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 CEO compensation 
 (1) (2) 
 LnCash Lntotal 
Residual director total compensation 0.106*** 0.309*** 
 (9.53) (23.71) 
LnSales t-1 0.024*** 0.029*** 
 (3.33) (3.90) 
Leverage t-1 -0.096 -0.006 
 (-1.10) (-0.06) 
Tobin’s q t-1 0.004 0.013* 
 (0.54) (1.67) 
Stock return  0.018 0.023 
 (1.43) (1.40) 
Stock return volatility -0.140*** -0.177*** 
 (-3.94) (-4.07) 
ROA t-1 0.064 0.007 
 (1.32) (0.13) 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 -0.244** -0.295** 
 (-2.37) (-2.40) 
Insider ownership t-1 -0.101* -0.169** 
 (-1.73) (-2.49) 
Total institutional ownership t-1 0.178*** 0.221*** 
 (4.67) (4.24) 
Board size t-1 0.021*** 0.024*** 
 (3.26) (3.16) 
Fraction of independent directors t-1 0.118* 0.361*** 
 (1.69) (4.49) 
Current board positions t-1 0.023 0.018 
 (0.97) (0.68) 
CEO Chairman t-1 -0.104* -0.101* 
 (-1.92) (-1.91) 
Age -0.003 -0.007*** 
 (-0.94) (-2.59) 
Tenure 0.003 -0.001 
 (1.22) (-0.34) 
External  -0.024 -0.021 
 (-0.88) (-0.65) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 5769 5769 
Adjusted R-sq 0.497 0.563 
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Table 4. The cronyism measures and other governance characteristics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of governance variables for subsamples of firms in the highest and lowest quintiles 
of the estimated abnormal compensation variables. The differences in means between the highest and lowest quintiles, 
along with the significance levels, are reported. CEO_DUE_TO_DIR is the proportion of CEO compensation explained 
by the director compensation variable. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the proportion of director compensation explained by 
the CEO compensation variable. Total institutional ownership is institutional ownership by all institutional investors 
as a percentage of market capitalization. Board size is the number of executive and non-executive directors on the 
board. Fraction of independent directors is the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. CEO 
Chairman is a dummy that equals one if the CEO is also the Chairman, and zero otherwise. Current board positions is 
the ratio of the number of current board positions held by all directors on the board to board size. Tenure is the number 
of years in position in the firm. CPS is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top five executive team 
captured by the CEO. CEO-director tie is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO has at least one network tie 
with other directors through past employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board) or past 
educational institutions, and zero otherwise. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Quintiles based on CEO_DUE_TO_DIR 
 N Highest quintile Lowest quintile  Difference 
Board size  1154 8.158 8.233  -0.076 
Total institutional ownership 1154 0.500 0.537  -0.037** 
Fraction of independent directors  1154 0.377 0.398  -0.020*** 
Current board positions 1154 1.733 1.744  -0.011 
CEO Chairman  1154 0.104 0.097  0.007 
Tenure 1154 6.610 6.026  0.584** 
CPS 1154 0.371 0.346  0.025* 
CEO-director tie 1154 0.275 0.233  0.042* 
            
Quintiles based on DIR_DUE_TO_CEO 
 N Highest quintile Lowest quintile  Difference 
Board size  1154 8.205 8.370  -0.165 
Total institutional ownership 1154 0.511 0.530  -0.019* 
Fraction of independent directors  1154 0.384 0.396  -0.012* 
Current board positions 1154 1.773 1.750  0.023 
CEO Chairman  1154 0.101 0.099  0.003 
Tenure 1154 6.495 6.068  0.427* 
CPS 1154 0.402 0.327  0.075*** 
CEO-director tie 1154 0.300 0.241  0.059** 
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Table 5. Abnormal compensation and firm performance 
 
This table provides estimated coefficients from regressions on firm performance/valuation over the following year. The 
dependent variables include: Industry-adj. Tobin’s q (ROA) is the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q (ROA) and the 
mean value for all firms in the same Fama-French 12 industry. Abnormal return is the annual abnormal returns derived 
from a three-factor Fama-French model. The variables of interest include: CEO_DUE_TO_DIR is the portion of CEO 
compensation due to the director compensation variable, while DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the portion of director compensation 
due to the CEO compensation variable. Other control variables include: LnSales is the logarithm of sales in constant 2005 
pounds. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation based on daily stock return over the prior year. CPS is the fraction 
of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top five executive team captured by the CEO. CEO-director tie is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a CEO has at least one network tie with other directors through past employment (either working 
as an employee or serving on the board) or past educational institutions, and zero otherwise. t-statistics are based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm le vel. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal  
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal  
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
CEO_DUE_TO_DIR t-1 -0.015* -0.197** -0.010 — — — 
 (-1.73) (-2.48) (-1.13)    
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — — — -0.027** -0.086** -0.012 
    (-2.15) (-2.32) (-1.25) 
CPS t-1 0.430** 0.024 0.044 0.408* 0.238** 0.045 
(2.13) (0.23) (1.46) (1.84) (2.29) (1.35) 
CEO-director tie t-1 -0.066 0.020 -0.011 -0.066 0.029 -0.011 
 (-1.11) (0.67) (-1.23) (-1.12) (0.94) (-1.22) 
Stock return volatility 0.043 0.315*** -0.045* 0.043 0.312*** -0.045* 
 (0.39) (4.00) (-1.81) (0.39) (3.94) (-1.81) 
LnSales t-1 0.002 -0.038*** 0.001 0.002 -0.037*** 0.001 
 (0.08) (-3.34) (0.16) (0.07) (-3.21) (0.16) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5471 5592 5471 5471 5592 5471 
Adjusted R-sq 0.010 0.029 0.016 0.010 0.029 0.016 
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Table 6. Director abnormal compensation and CEO turnover 
 
This table displays the results of logit regressions on CEO turnover. The sample consists of 5,129 observations with 
available data on CEO turnover in year t (1999-2009) and explanatory variables in the year prior to the turnover. 
The dependent variables are the overall and forced turnover dummies. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the proportion of 
director compensation due to the CEO compensation variable. Other control variables include: CEO pay slice (CPS) 
is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top five executive team captured by the CEO. CEO-
director tie is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO has at least one network tie with other directors through 
past employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board) or past educational institutions, and zero 
otherwise. Board size is the number of executive and non-executive directors. Fraction of independent directors is 
the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. Firm-specific return is the difference between firm 
stock return and Market return over the year prior to the CEO turnover, where Market return is the FTSE All Share 
index return. Tenure dummy equals one if CEO tenure falls within the corresponding range, e.g. CEO tenure=2 
equals one if CEO tenure is between two and three years. CEO tenure=1 is the hold-out group. CEO age>60 dummy 
is a dummy equal to one if the CEO’s age is above 60, and zero otherwise. CEO Chairman is a dummy equal to one 
if the CEO is also the Chairman, and zero otherwise. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The industry dummies 
are based on the 12 Fama-French industries. 
 Overall turnover Forced turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 -0.185*** -0.127** -0.145** -0.093* 
 (-2.98) (-2.01) (-2.43) (-1.92) 
CPS t-1 — -1.292*** — -0.965** 
  (-3.58)  (-2.12) 
CEO-director tie t-1 — -0.151 — -0.266* 
  (-1.28)  (-1.65) 
Board size t-1 0.063* 0.047* 0.058 0.048 
 (1.82) (1.69) (1.60) (1.17) 
Fraction of indep. dirs t-1 -0.121 0.161 0.018 0.236 
 (-0.49) (0.60) (0.06) (0.70) 
Firm-specific return t-1 -0.185* -0.192** -0.486*** -0.494*** 
 (-1.93) (-2.03) (-3.07) (-3.12) 
Market return t-1 7.116*** 6.915*** 5.987*** 5.836*** 
 (7.31) (7.23) (4.68) (4.59) 
CEO tenure=2 t-1 0.099 0.106 0.262 0.272 
 (0.76) (0.81) (1.51) (1.56) 
CEO tenure=3 t-1 -0.154 -0.149 -0.083 -0.066 
 (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.39) (-0.31) 
CEO tenure=4 t-1 -0.041 -0.036 0.028 0.040 
 (-0.26) (-0.23) (0.13) (0.18) 
CEO tenure=5 t-1 0.139 0.136 0.034 0.035 
 (0.83) (0.81) (0.14) (0.14) 
CEO tenure=6 t-1 0.112 0.100 0.020 0.021 
 (0.63) (0.56) (0.08) (0.08) 
CEO tenure>6 t-1 0.047 0.042 -0.319* -0.320* 
 (0.37) (0.33) (-1.72) (-1.72) 
CEO age>60 dummy t-1 0.485*** 0.470*** -1.625*** -1.627*** 
 (3.76) (3.59) (-4.23) (-4.24) 
CEO Chairman t-1 0.290** 0.264** 0.291 0.279 
 (2.20) (2.01) (1.52) (1.45) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5129 5129 5129 5129 
Pseudo R-sq 0.057 0.061 0.067 0.070 
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Table 7. Director abnormal compensation and CEO turnover performance sensitivity 
 
This table examines whether director abnormal compensation affects CEO turnover performance sensitivity. The sample 
consists of 5,129 observations with available data on CEO turnover in year t (1999-2009) and explanatory variables in 
the year prior to the turnover. The dependent variables are the overall and forced turnover dummies. The variables of 
interest include: Firm-specific return and its interaction with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, where Firm-specific return is the 
difference between firm stock return and the market return over the year prior to the CEO turnover. Positive firm-
specific return and Negative firm-specific return and their interactions with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, where Positive 
(Negative) firm-specific return is the firm-specific return if that return is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the proportion of director compensation due to the CEO compensation variable. The other 
control variables are the same as in Table 6 model 2. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The industry dummies are 
based on the 12 Fama-French industries. 
 Overall turnover  Forced turnover  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 -0.128** 0.025 -0.069* 0.218 
 (-2.06) (0.27) (-1.72) (1.07) 
Firm-specific return t-1 -0.192** — -0.553*** — 
 (-1.99)  (-3.40)  
Firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 0.010 — 0.217** — 
 (0.09)  (2.50)  
Positive firm-specific return t-1 — -0.010 — -0.104 
  (-0.13)  (-0.75) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1 — -0.808*** — -1.262*** 
  (-3.93)  (-4.90) 
Positive firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — -0.136 — 0.003 
  (-1.17)  (0.03) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — 0.777** — 0.872** 
  (2.37)  (2.25) 
Market return t-1 6.917*** 6.991*** 5.836*** 5.708*** 
 (7.22) (7.18) (4.61) (4.48) 
CPS t-1 -1.292*** -1.260*** -0.935** -0.927** 
 (-3.58) (-3.50) (-2.06) (-2.05) 
CEO-director tie t-1 -0.151 -0.158 -0.267* -0.284* 
 (-1.28) (-1.34) (-1.65) (-1.75) 
Board size t-1 0.047 0.056* 0.048 0.062* 
 (1.49) (1.92) (1.26) (1.83) 
Fraction of independent directors t-1 0.161 0.223 0.248 0.344 
 (0.60) (0.83) (0.74) (1.02) 
CEO tenure=2 t-1 0.106 0.092 0.271 0.250 
 (0.81) (0.70) (1.55) (1.41) 
CEO tenure=3 t-1 -0.149 -0.155 -0.058 -0.051 
 (-0.95) (-0.98) (-0.27) (-0.24) 
CEO tenure=4 t-1 -0.037 -0.025 0.045 0.066 
 (-0.23) (-0.16) (0.20) (0.30) 
CEO tenure=5 t-1 0.136 0.147 0.043 0.060 
 (0.81) (0.87) (0.17) (0.24) 
CEO tenure=6 t-1 0.100 0.094 0.021 0.014 
 (0.56) (0.52) (0.08) (0.06) 
CEO tenure>6 t-1 0.042 0.056 -0.315* -0.301 
 (0.33) (0.44) (-1.70) (-1.61) 
CEO age>60 dummy t-1 0.470*** 0.470*** -1.630*** -1.636*** 
 (3.59) (3.57) (-4.24) (-4.25) 
CEO Chairman t-1 0.265** 0.268** 0.282 0.288 
 (2.01) (2.04) (1.47) (1.50) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5129 5129 5129 5129 
Pseudo R-sq 0.061 0.065 0.071 0.076 
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Table 8. Institutional investors and the impact of director compensation on CEO 
compensation 
 
This table examines how institutional investors change the effect of director compensation on CEO compensation. The 
dependent variables are the logarithms of CEO cash and total compensation in constant 2005 pounds, respectively. The 
variables of interest are: Residual director total compensation is the sum of residuals from the director total compensation 
regression (model 2 Table 2) of all board members in the firm, and its interaction term with Total institutional ownership. 
Total institutional ownership is institutional ownership by all institutional investors as a percentage of market 
capitalization. The other control variables include the same firm, CEO and governance characteristics as in models 3 and 
4 of Table 2. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 CEO compensation 
 (1) (2) 
 LnCash Lntotal 
Residual director total compensation 0.158*** 0.305*** 
 (7.13) (10.09) 
Residual director total compensation×Total institutional ownership -0.093** 0.008 
 (-2.41) (0.15) 
LnSales t-1 0.025*** 0.029*** 
 (3.49) (3.87) 
Leverage t-1 -0.096 -0.006 
 (-1.11) (-0.06) 
Tobin’s q t-1 0.004 0.013* 
 (0.57) (1.66) 
Stock return  0.018 0.023 
 (1.46) (1.40) 
Stock return volatility -0.143*** -0.176*** 
 (-4.05) (-4.06) 
ROA t-1 0.062 0.007 
 (1.29) (0.14) 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 -0.252** -0.295** 
 (-2.47) (-2.40) 
Insider ownership -0.106* -0.169** 
 (-1.80) (-2.49) 
Total institutional ownership 0.172*** 0.222*** 
 (4.43) (4.21) 
Board size 0.020*** 0.024*** 
 (3.17) (3.15) 
Fraction of independent directors 0.111 0.362*** 
 (1.58) (4.47) 
Current board positions 0.024 0.018 
 (1.03) (0.68) 
CEO Chairman -0.105* -0.101* 
 (-1.94) (-1.90) 
Age -0.003 -0.007*** 
 (-0.95) (-2.59) 
Tenure 0.003 -0.001 
 (1.21) (-0.34) 
External  -0.024 -0.021 
 (-0.88) (-0.65) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 5769 5769 
Adjusted R-sq 0.499 0.563 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Institutional investors, director compensation and CEO turnover 
 
This table examines whether institutional ownership alters the relation between CEO turnover and director abnormal compensation. The variables of interest are: DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is 
the proportion of director compensation due to the CEO compensation variable and its interaction with Total institutional ownership, where Total institutional ownership is institutional 
ownership by all institutional investors as a percentage of market capitalization. Firm-specific return is the difference between firm stock return and the market return over the year prior 
to the CEO turnover. Positive firm-specific return and Negative firm-specific return and their interactions with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, where Positive (Negative) firm-specific return is the 
firm-specific return if that return is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. The other control variables are the same as in Table 6 model 2. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The industry dummies are based on the 12 Fama-French industries.  
 Overall turnover dummy Forced turnover dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Whole 
sample 
High 
institutional 
ownership 
Low 
institutional 
ownership 
Whole 
sample 
High 
institutional 
ownership 
Low 
institutional 
ownership 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 -0.282** 0.042 -0.010 -0.184* 0.187 -0.015 
 (-2.34) (0.33) (-0.08) (-1.87) (1.09) (-0.07) 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1×Total institutional ownership t-1 0.334* — — 0.169* — — 
 (1.74)   (1.87)   
Total institutional ownership t-1 -0.121 — — -0.015 — — 
 (-0.76)   (-0.07)   
Firm-specific return t-1 -0.193** — — -0.493*** — — 
 (-2.07)   (-3.11)   
Positive firm-specific return t-1 — -0.060 -0.040 — -0.252 -0.096 
  (-0.36) (-0.39)  (-0.79) (-0.61) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1 — -1.273*** -0.513* — -1.333*** -1.125*** 
  (-3.72) (-1.92)  (-2.91) (-3.40) 
Positive firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — -0.086 -0.132 — -0.089 0.227 
  (-0.71) (-0.82)  (-0.52) (0.83) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — 0.539 0.765* — 0.240 1.651** 
  (1.03) (1.84)  (0.42) (2.32) 
Market return t-1 6.793*** 10.858*** 4.897*** 5.779*** 8.820*** 3.169* 
 (7.05) (5.79) (4.03) (4.57) (4.67) (1.71) 
CPS t-1 -1.280*** -1.734*** -1.071** -0.950** -1.761** -0.519 
 (-3.55) (-2.71) (-2.52) (-2.07) (-2.04) (-0.99) 
CEO-director tie t-1 -0.150 -0.300* -0.074 -0.266* -0.280 -0.324 
 (-1.27) (-1.86) (-0.46) (-1.65) (-1.28) (-1.41) 
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Board size t-1 0.049* 0.063* 0.045 0.049 0.029 0.083* 
 (1.78) (1.69) (1.33) (1.48) (0.74) (1.71) 
Fraction of independent directors t-1 0.219 0.559 0.230 0.241 0.682 0.346 
 (0.80) (1.19) (0.73) (0.70) (1.06) (0.85) 
CEO tenure=2 t-1 0.102 0.370* -0.148 0.269 0.148 0.291 
 (0.78) (1.84) (-0.82) (1.54) (0.54) (1.25) 
CEO tenure=3 t-1 -0.147 0.084 -0.355* -0.066 0.021 -0.130 
 (-0.93) (0.36) (-1.65) (-0.31) (0.07) (-0.44) 
CEO tenure=4 t-1 -0.033 0.172 -0.127 0.040 -0.040 0.094 
 (-0.21) (0.68) (-0.62) (0.18) (-0.12) (0.32) 
CEO tenure=5 t-1 0.142 0.430* -0.071 0.036 0.102 0.031 
 (0.84) (1.73) (-0.30) (0.15) (0.30) (0.09) 
CEO tenure=6 t-1 0.103 0.565** -0.339 0.020 0.434 -0.546 
 (0.58) (2.18) (-1.26) (0.08) (1.36) (-1.27) 
CEO tenure>6 t-1 0.039 0.411** -0.270 -0.324* -0.276 -0.343 
 (0.31) (2.05) (-1.58) (-1.74) (-1.02) (-1.35) 
CEO age>60 dummy t-1 0.469*** 0.726*** 0.278 -1.627*** -1.242** -1.944*** 
 (3.58) (3.69) (1.48) (-4.23) (-2.30) (-3.58) 
CEO Chairman t-1 0.255* 0.308 0.265 0.280 -0.038 0.429* 
 (1.93) (1.45) (1.61) (1.45) (-0.10) (1.82) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5129 2573 2556 5129 2573 2531 
Pseudo R-sq 0.061 0.083 0.068 0.070 0.093 0.080 
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Table 10. Institutional investors, abnormal compensation and firm performance  
 
This table re-estimates the models in Table 5 for subsamples of different levels of institutional ownership. We classify a firm into the high (low) institutional ownership group if Total 
institutional ownership is above (below) the sample median. The dependent variables include: Industry-adj. Tobin’s q (ROA) is the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q (ROA) and 
the mean value for all firms in the same Fama-French 12 industry. Abnormal return is the annual abnormal returns derived from the three-factor Fama-French model. The variables of 
interest include: CEO_DUE_TO_DIR is the proportion of CEO compensation due to the director compensation variable, while DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the proportion of director 
compensation due to the CEO compensation variable. For simplicity, only the coefficient estimates on the variables of interest are presented, while the same set of controls as in Table 
5 along with year dummies are included in each regression. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 Firm-fixed effects regression 
 High institutional ownership  Low institutional ownership 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal  
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal  
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
CEO_DUE_TO_DIR t-1 
0.085 -0.193 0.009  -0.093* -0.233* -0.022 
(1.48) (-1.51) (1.55)  (-1.92) (-1.91) (-1.61) 
 2753 2810 2753  2718 2782 2718 
        
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 
0.032 -0.082 0.005  -0.053* -0.097** -0.014 
(1.25) (-1.48) (0.87)  (-1.91) (-2.14) (-1.37) 
 2753 2810 2753  2718 2782 2718 
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Table 11 
Firm performance and director abnormal compensation by board committee  
 
This table provides estimated coefficients from regressions on firm performance/valuation over the following year. The dependent variables include: Industry-adj. Tobin’s q (ROA) is 
the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q (ROA) and the mean value for all firms in the same Fama-French 12 industry. Abnormal return is the annual abnormal returns derived from 
a three-factor Fama-French model. The variables of interest include: CEO_DUE_TO_DIR is the proportion of CEO compensation due to the director compensation variable. 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_AUD is the proportion of compensation to directors sitting on the audit committee explained by the CEO compensation variable. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_COM is 
the proportion of compensation to directors sitting on the compensation committee explained by the CEO compensation variable. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_NOM is the proportion of 
compensation to directors sitting on the nomination committee explained by the CEO compensation variable. For simplicity, only the coefficient estimates on the variables of interest 
are presented, while the same set of controls as in Table 5 are included in each regression. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm le vel. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Year dummies results are suppressed.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal 
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal 
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal 
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ AUD t-1 -0.034 -0.094 0.011 — — — — — — 
 (-0.06) (-0.39) (1.18)       
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ COM t-1 — — — -0.019 -0.121* -0.027 — — — 
    (-1.56) (-1.82) (-1.31)    
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_NOM t-1 — — — — — — -0.038* -0.255** -0.033 
       (-1.87) (-2.03) (-0.62) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5471 5592 5471 5471 5592 5471 5471 5592 5471 
Adjusted R-sq 0.010 0.021 0.016 0.010 0.022 0.016 0.010 0.022 0.016 
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Table 12 
CEO turnover performance sensitivity and director abnormal compensation by board committee  
This table examines whether institutional ownership alters the relationship between CEO turnover and director abnormal compensation. The variables of interest are: 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_AUD is the proportion of compensation to directors sitting on the audit committee explained by the CEO compensation variable. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_COM is 
the proportion of compensation to directors sitting on the compensation committee explained by the CEO compensation variable. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_NOM is the proportion of 
compensation to directors sitting on the nomination committee explained by the CEO compensation variable. Positive firm-specific return and Negative firm-specific return and their 
interactions with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, where Positive (Negative) firm-specific return is the firm-specific return if that return is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. For simplicity, 
only the coefficient estimates on the variables of interest are presented, while the same set of controls as in Table 6 model 2 are included in each regression. t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Year and industry-level dummies results are 
suppressed. Industry dummy variables are based on 12 Fama-French industries.  
 Overall turnover Forced turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Positive firm-specific return t-1 0.052 0.053 0.067 -0.102 -0.103 -0.096 
 (0.70) (0.71) (0.84) (-0.76) (-0.76) (-0.70) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1 -0.468** -0.469** -0.488** -1.110*** -1.113*** -1.115*** 
 (-2.34) (-2.35) (-2.45) (-4.50) (-4.51) (-4.52) 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ AUD t-1 -0.147 — — -0.355 — — 
 (-0.90)   (-0.96)   
Positive firm-specific return t-1 × DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ AUD t-1 -0.406 — — -0.071 — — 
 (-0.52)   (-0.42)   
Negative firm-specific return t-1 × DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ AUD t-1 1.368 — — 1.245 — — 
      (1.15)   (1.11)   
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ COM t-1 — -0.140 — — -0.333 — 
  (-0.86)   (-1.27)  
Positive firm-specific return t-1 × DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ COM t-1 — -0.390 — — -0.056 — 
       (-1.08)   (-0.34)  
Negative firm-specific return t-1 × DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ COM t-1 — 1.321 — — 1.152 — 
  (1.57)   (1.37)  
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_NOM t-1 — — -0.107 — — -0.288* 
   (-0.69)   (-1.76) 
Positive firm-specific return t-1 × DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_NOM t-1 — — -0.310 — — -0.084 
        (-1.44)   (-0.50) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1 × DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_NOM t-1 — — 1.104** — — 1.164** 
        (2.18)   (1.99) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5129 5129 5129 5129 5129 5129 
Pseudo R-sq 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.076 0.075 0.075 
 
45 
 
Table 13. Abnormal compensation and earnings management 
 
This table examines the relation between abnormal compensation and earnings management, and whether institutional 
ownership influences this relation. The dependent variable DA is discretionary accruals estimated from the modified 
version of the Jones model. The variables of interest include: CEO_DUE_TO_DIR is the proportion of CEO 
compensation due to the director compensation variable. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the proportion of director 
compensation due to the CEO compensation variable and its interaction with Total institutional ownership. The other 
control variables include the same firm, CEO and governance characteristics as in the baseline compensation 
regressions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The industry dummies are based on the 12 Fama-French 
industries.  
 
(1) 
DA 
(2) 
DA 
(3) 
DA     
CEO_DUE_TO_DIR t-1 0.036 — — 
 (1.63)   
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — 0.020** 0.026** 
  (2.07) (2.23) 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1×Total institutional 
ownership t-1 — — -0.012* 
   (-1.73) 
LnSales t-1 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (1.05) (1.04) (1.04) 
Leverage t-1 0.049 0.049 0.048 
 (0.69) (0.68) (0.67) 
Tobin’s q t-1 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Stock return  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
Stock return volatility -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 
 (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.51) 
ROA t-1 0.358*** 0.358*** 0.358*** 
 (6.10) (6.13) (6.12) 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 0.088 0.089 0.089 
 (0.77) (0.78) (0.78) 
Insider ownership 0.074 0.074 0.075 
 (1.02) (1.02) (1.03) 
Total institutional ownership -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.17) 
Board size -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** 
 (-2.17) (-2.17) (-2.18) 
Fraction of independent directors -0.071 -0.070 -0.071 
 (-1.04) (-1.04) (-1.03) 
Current board positions 0.019 0.018 0.018 
 (1.09) (1.07) (1.08) 
CEO Chairman -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.21) 
Age -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 (-1.66) (-1.68) (-1.68) 
Tenure 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.98) (0.99) (1.00) 
External  -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 (-0.59) (-0.55) (-0.55)     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 5156 5156 5156 
Adjusted R-sq 0.026 0.027 0.027 
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Appendix A. Compensation variables and the determinants of compensation 
 
Variable Definition 
A. Compensation variables 
Cash compensation  The sum of salary and bonus in constant 2005 pounds. 
Equity compensation The sum of stock and option awards in constant 2005 pounds. It is 
calculated as the sum of the market value of shares, long-term incentive 
plans and option plans estimated using the Black-Scholes model.  
Total compensation The sum of cash and equity compensation in constant 2005 pounds. 
Residual director total 
compensation 
The sum of the residual compensation of all board members in the firm, 
where the residual compensation is the residual in the director total 
compensation regression (i.e., model 2 Table 2). 
 
B. Firm characteristics 
LnSales t-1 The logarithm of sales in constant 2005 pounds at the previous financial 
year end. 
Leverage t-1 Total debt divided by total assets at the previous financial year end. 
Tobin’s q t-1 Total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided 
by total assets, at the previous financial year end. 
Stock return Holding period stock return over the past year.  
Stock-return volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for the past year. 
Firm-specific return The difference between firm stock return and the market return. 
Positive firm-specific return It equals the firm-specific return if that return is positive, and zero 
otherwise. 
Negative firm-specific return It equals the firm-specific return if that return is negative, and zero 
otherwise. 
ROA t-1 Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITA) 
divided by total assets, at the previous financial year end. 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 The ratio of tangible assets (i.e., plant, property, and equipment) to total 
assets, at the previous financial year end. 
  
C. Ownership structure  
Insider ownership The number of closely held shares by insiders as a percentage of the 
number of shares outstanding, where insiders are defined as shareholders 
who hold at least 5% of the outstanding shares such as officers and directors 
and immediate families, other corporations, and individuals. 
Total institutional ownership Institutional ownership by all institutional investors as a percentage of 
market capitalization. 
 
D. Board characteristics 
Board size The total number of executive and non-executive directors. 
Fraction of independent 
directors 
The ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. 
CEO Chairman Dummy that equals one if the CEO is also the Chairman, and zero 
otherwise. 
Current board positions The ratio of the number of current board positions held by all directors on 
the board to board size. 
 
 
E. CEO/director characteristics 
Age Age of the CEO/director in years. 
Tenure Number of years the CEO/director had been in the current position. 
External  Dummy that equals one if the CEO/director is hired from outside the firm, 
and zero otherwise. 
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CEO_DUE_TO_DIR The proportion of CEO compensation explained by the director 
compensation variable. 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO The proportion of director compensation explained by the CEO 
compensation variable. 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ AUD The proportion of compensation to directors sitting on the audit committee 
explained by the CEO compensation variable. 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ COM The proportion of compensation to directors sitting on the compensation 
committee explained by the CEO compensation variable. 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO_ NOM The proportion of compensation to directors sitting on the nomination 
committee explained by the CEO compensation variable. 
CEO pay slice (CPS) The fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top five 
executives captured by the CEO. 
CEO-director tie Dummy that equals one if the CEO has at least one network tie with the 
other directors through past employment (either working as an employee 
or serving on the board) or past educational institutions, and zero otherwise. 
Only network ties established during overlapping years are included. 
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Table A1 
Section 3.1: The impact of director compensation on CEO compensation using alternative 
measures of residual director compensation 
 
This table examines the impact of director compensation on CEO compensation using alternative measures of residual 
director compensation. The dependent variables are the logarithm of CEO cash compensation in constant 2005 pounds 
and the logarithm of CEO total compensation in constant 2005 pounds respectively. The variables of interest are: Fraction 
of excessively paid directors is the ratio of the number of excessively paid directors to board size, where excessively paid 
directors are those with positive residual compensation. Residual director total compensation_Average is the average 
(instead of the sum) of residual compensation of all directors on the board. Other controls are included. t-statistics are 
based on robust standard error clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. Year dummies results are suppressed. 
 CEO compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnCash Lntotal LnCash Lntotal 
Fraction of excessively paid directors 0.664*** 1.605*** — — 
 (14.36) (24.42)   
Residual director total compensation_Average — — 0.257*** 0.751*** 
   (11.81) (24.88) 
LnSales t-1 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 
 (3.00) (3.28) (3.34) (4.03) 
Leverage t-1 -0.095 -0.005 -0.085 0.026 
 (-1.07) (-0.05) (-0.98) (0.30) 
Tobin’s q t-1 0.004 0.013 0.005 0.016** 
 (0.55) (1.55) (0.67) (2.04) 
Stock return  0.020 0.026 0.016 0.019 
 (1.59) (1.49) (1.33) (1.20) 
Stock return volatility -0.139*** -0.173*** -0.147*** -0.197*** 
 (-3.87) (-3.59) (-4.22) (-4.75) 
ROA t-1 0.049 -0.031 0.065 0.010 
 (1.01) (-0.54) (1.36) (0.19) 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 -0.228** -0.259** -0.262** -0.348*** 
 (-2.23) (-2.02) (-2.57) (-2.90) 
Insider ownership -0.095 -0.153** -0.091 -0.141** 
 (-1.62) (-2.12) (-1.58) (-2.19) 
Total institutional ownership 0.177*** 0.217*** 0.178*** 0.220*** 
 (4.61) (4.01) (4.77) (4.52) 
Board size 0.018*** 0.018** 0.019*** 0.019** 
 (2.80) (2.22) (3.01) (2.57) 
Fraction of independent directors 0.195*** 0.543*** 0.114 0.349*** 
 (2.75) (6.05) (1.64) (4.46) 
Current board positions 0.031 0.041 0.024 0.021 
 (1.30) (1.37) (1.03) (0.81) 
CEO Chairman -0.107* -0.103* -0.108** -0.113** 
 (-1.90) (-1.77) (-1.98) (-2.11) 
Age -0.003 -0.010*** -0.003 -0.007*** 
 (-1.23) (-3.30) (-0.94) (-2.59) 
Tenure 0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.000 
 (1.60) (0.61) (1.31) (-0.13) 
External  -0.023 -0.019 -0.019 -0.007 
 (-0.85) (-0.56) (-0.71) (-0.23) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5769 5769 5769 5769 
Adjusted R-sq 0.488 0.468 0.502 0.591 
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Table A2 
Section 3.1: The impact of director compensation on CEO compensation using 
alternative measures of residual director compensation 
 
This table examines the impact of director compensation on CEO compensation using another alternative measure 
of residual director compensation. In Panel A, we rerun the director total compensation regression, where the 
dependent variable is defined as the average total compensation received by all directors on a board. Panel B 
presents the regression results of CEO cash and total compensation on Residual director total compensation 2, 
where Residual director total compensation 2 is the residual in the first-step director compensation regression in 
Panel A. Average_Age is the average age of all directors on a board. Average_Tenure is the average tenure of all 
directors on a board. Percent_External is the percentage of externally hired directors on a board. Other controls 
are included. t-statistics are based on robust standard error clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Year dummies results are suppressed. 
Panel A: First-step director compensation regression 
 Average director total compensation 
 (1) 
 Lntotal 
LnSales t-1 0.029*** 
 (3.03) 
Leverage t-1 0.006 
 (0.06) 
Tobin’s q t-1 0.008 
 (0.79) 
Stock return  0.026 
 (1.49) 
Stock return volatility -0.155*** 
 (-2.90) 
ROA t-1 -0.050 
 (-0.74) 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 -0.284** 
 (-2.11) 
Insider ownership -0.223*** 
 (-3.00) 
Total institutional ownership 0.083 
 (1.42) 
Board size 0.018** 
 (2.42) 
Fraction of independent directors 0.368*** 
 (3.77) 
Current board positions 0.061** 
 (2.08) 
CEO Chairman 0.017 
 (0.36) 
Average_Age -0.006** 
 (-2.18) 
Average_Tenure -0.000 
 (-0.10) 
Percent_External -0.036 
 (-1.07) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
N 5,769 
Adjusted R-sq 0.355 
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Panel B: The impact of director compensation on CEO compensation 
 CEO compensation 
 (1) (2) 
 LnCash Lntotal 
Residual director total compensation 2 0.260*** 0.761*** 
 (12.21) (25.71) 
LnSales t-1 0.023*** 0.028*** 
 (3.34) (3.83) 
Leverage t-1 -0.101 -0.020 
 (-1.18) (-0.24) 
Tobin’s q t-1 0.004 0.013 
 (0.52) (1.63) 
Stock return  0.015 0.016 
 (1.24) (0.99) 
Stock return volatility -0.138*** -0.170*** 
 (-3.96) (-4.15) 
ROA t-1 0.063 0.004 
 (1.32) (0.09) 
PPE t-1/TA t-1 -0.257** -0.331*** 
 (-2.53) (-2.84) 
Insider ownership -0.094* -0.150** 
 (-1.66) (-2.42) 
Total institutional ownership 0.174*** 0.208*** 
 (4.65) (4.28) 
Board size 0.022*** 0.027*** 
 (3.46) (3.73) 
Fraction of independent directors 0.113* 0.348*** 
 (1.65) (4.55) 
Current board positions 0.026 0.027 
 (1.14) (1.10) 
CEO Chairman -0.096* -0.077 
 (-1.78) (-1.49) 
Age -0.002 -0.007** 
 (-0.87) (-2.43) 
Tenure 0.003 -0.001 
 (1.23) (-0.34) 
External  -0.018 -0.003 
 (-0.66) (-0.09) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 5,769 5,769 
Adjusted R-sq 0.504 0.602 
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Table A3 
Footnote 16: Abnormal compensation and subsequent stock returns 
 
This table tracks the subsequent stock returns of the five groups based on abnormal compensation. For each year, 
we divide all of the firms in the sample into five groups based on CEO_DUE_TO_DIR or DIR_DUE_TO_CEO 
and then track their subsequent stock returns. Panel A presents the annual returns for the five groups from year t + 
2 to t + 5. Panel B shows the cumulative returns for the five groups from year t + 2 to t + 5. The cumulative returns 
are simply the sum of annual returns. For instance, the five-year cumulative return is the sum of annual returns 
from one year to five years after portfolio formation. The difference in subsequent stock returns between the top 
and bottom groups are reported. t-statistics are based on the Newey-West standard errors. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Subsequent annual returns  
Portfolio of CEO_DUE_TO_DIR i is years after portfolio formation 
 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 
1: Bottom 20.42% 12.60% 12.81% 12.66% 
2 16.49% 12.89% 8.07% 11.21% 
3 11.95% 7.38% 8.49% 9.45% 
4 9.10% 6.77% 9.12% 10.35% 
5: Top 6.50% 5.69% 8.55% 9.58% 
Top minus Bottom -13.92%*** -6.91%** -4.26%* -3.08% 
t-value -4.11 -3.04 -2.03 -1.40 
     
 
Portfolio of DIR_DUE_TO_CEO i is years after portfolio formation 
 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 
1: Bottom 19.39% 13.11% 10.70% 13.52% 
2 12.89% 9.78% 10.90% 11.28% 
3 10.44% 7.09% 8.09% 9.46% 
4 10.63% 9.43% 11.05% 11.93% 
5: Top 6.10% 6.01% 9.41% 11.96% 
Top minus Bottom -13.29%*** -7.10%** -1.29% -1.56% 
t-value -3.6 -3.13 -0.66 -0.84 
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Panel B: Subsequent cumulative returns 
Portfolio of CEO_DUE_TO_DIR i is years after portfolio formation 
 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 
1: Bottom 34.67% 47.27% 60.08% 72.74% 
2 29.78% 42.67% 50.74% 61.95% 
3 22.67% 30.05% 38.54% 47.99% 
4 19.48% 26.25% 35.37% 45.72% 
5: Top 23.77% 29.46% 38.01% 47.59% 
Top minus Bottom -10.90% -17.81%** -22.07%** -25.15%*** 
t-value -1.56 -2.34 -2.87 -3.28 
 
     
Portfolio of  DIR_DUE_TO_CEO i is years after portfolio formation 
 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 
1: Bottom 32.59% 45.70% 56.40% 69.92% 
2 21.75% 31.53% 42.43% 53.71% 
3 20.29% 27.38% 35.47% 44.93% 
4 19.37% 28.80% 39.85% 51.78% 
5: Top 23.08% 29.09% 38.50% 50.46% 
Top minus Bottom -9.51% -16.61%* -17.90%* -19.46%** 
t-value -1.22 -1.85 -1.96 -2.54 
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Table A4 
Section 3.4.2: Abnormal compensation and firm performance with additional committee-level controls 
 
This table provides estimated coefficients from regressions on firm performance/valuation over the following year. The dependent variables include: Industry-adj. Tobin’s q (ROA) 
is the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q (ROA) and the mean value for all firms in the same Fama-French 12 industry. Abnormal return is the annual abnormal returns 
derived from a three-factor Fama-French model. The variables of interest include: CEO_DUE_TO_DIR is the portion of CEO compensation due to the director compensation 
variable, while DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the portion of director compensation due to the CEO compensation variable. Other control variables include: Audit committee independence 
is the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the audit committee. Compensation committee independence is the ratio of the number of 
independent directors to the total number of directors on the compensation committee. Nomination committee independence is the ratio of the number of independent directors to 
the total number of directors on the nomination committee. CEO on committee is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO is on either the compensation committee or the 
nomination committee, and zero otherwise. LnSales t-1 is the logarithm of sales in constant 2005 pounds. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation based on daily stock 
return over the prior year. CPS t-1 is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top five executive team captured by the CEO. CEO-director tie t-1 is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a CEO has at least one network tie with other directors through past employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board) or past educational 
institutions, and zero otherwise. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm le vel. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal 
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal 
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
CEO_DUE_TO_DIR t-1 -0.059* -0.196*** 0.007 — — — 
 (-1.77) (-4.98) (0.91)    
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — — — -0.019 -0.087*** -0.002 
    (-1.34) (-4.76) (-0.53) 
Audit committee independence -0.568 -0.259 -0.026 -0.570 -0.243 -0.025 
 (-1.33) (-1.14) (-0.44) (-1.34) (-1.06) (-0.43) 
Compensation committee independence 0.374 -0.226 0.017 0.377 -0.241 0.016 
 (1.12) (-1.01) (0.26) (1.12) (-1.08) (0.26) 
Nomination committee independence -0.041 0.245** 0.034 -0.036 0.224** 0.033 
 (-0.20) (2.29) (1.24) (-0.18) (2.13) (1.23) 
CEO on committee 0.035 0.015 -0.001 0.037 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.55) (0.42) (-0.15) (0.58) (0.25) (-0.12) 
CPS t-1 0.202 0.072 0.080*** 0.157 0.276*** 0.084** 
 (1.03) (0.67) (2.65) (0.72) (2.67) (2.56) 
CEO-director tie t-1 -0.039 0.010 -0.014 -0.041 0.020 -0.014 
 (-0.65) (0.33) (-1.57) (-0.69) (0.64) (-1.54) 
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Stock return volatility 0.029 0.343*** -0.036* 0.030 0.339*** -0.036* 
 (0.31) (4.81) (-1.68) (0.32) (4.73) (-1.69) 
LnSales t-1 -0.025 -0.030*** 0.005 -0.025 -0.029*** 0.005 
 (-1.07) (-2.68) (1.27) (-1.07) (-2.63) (1.28)               
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5471 5592 5471 5471 5592 5471 
Adjusted R-sq 0.002 0.022 0.007 0.002 0.022 0.007 
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Table A5 
Section 3.4.2: Director abnormal compensation and CEO turnover performance sensitivity  
with additional committee-level controls 
 
This table examines whether director abnormal compensation affects CEO turnover performance sensitivity. The sample consists of 5,129 observations with available data on 
CEO turnover in year t (1999-2009) and explanatory variables in the year prior to the turnover. The dependent variables are the overall and forced turnover dummies. The variables 
of interest include: Firm-specific return and its interaction with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, where Firm-specific return is the difference between firm stock return and the market return 
over the year prior to the CEO turnover. Positive firm-specific return and Negative firm-specific return and their interactions with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, where Positive (Negative) 
firm-specific return is the firm-specific return if that return is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the proportion of director compensation due to the 
CEO compensation variable. Audit committee independence is the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the audit committee. 
Compensation committee independence is the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the compensation committee. Nomination committee 
independence is the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the nomination committee. CEO on committee is a dummy variable that equals 
one if a CEO is on either the compensation committee or the nomination committee, and zero otherwise. The other control variables are the same as in Table 6 model 2. t-statistics 
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The industry dummies are based 
on the 12 Fama-French industries. 
 Overall turnover  Forced turnover  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 -0.104 0.015 0.056 0.198 
 (-1.60) (0.17) (0.64) (1.64) 
Firm-specific return t-1 -0.073  -0.504*** — 
 (-0.94)  (-3.43)  
Firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 -0.015  0.198** — 
 (-0.16)  (2.46)  
Positive firm-specific return t-1 — 0.043  -0.121 
  (0.61)  (-0.89) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1 — -0.483**  -1.119*** 
  (-2.39)  (-4.52) 
Positive firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — -0.120  0.010 
  (-1.15)  (0.10) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — 0.556*  0.780** 
  (1.83)  (2.08) 
Audit committee independence -0.332 -0.336 0.869 0.838 
 (-0.67) (-0.68) (1.01) (0.98) 
Compensation committee independence 0.537 0.594 -0.201 -0.127 
 (1.33) (1.47) (-0.28) (-0.18) 
Nomination committee independence -0.084 -0.095 0.182 0.197 
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 (-0.25) (-0.28) (0.37) (0.40) 
CEO on committee 0.045 0.059 0.155 0.184 
 (0.37) (0.48) (0.98) (1.16) 
Market return t-1 0.507* 0.479* 2.186*** 2.139*** 
 (1.90) (1.79) (4.94) (4.78) 
CPS t-1 -1.627*** -1.611*** -0.905** -0.912** 
 (-4.33) (-4.26) (-1.98) (-2.01) 
CEO-director tie t-1 -0.185 -0.189 -0.296* -0.311** 
 (-1.59) (-1.63) (-1.88) (-1.97) 
Board size t-1 0.070*** 0.077*** 0.056** 0.067*** 
 (3.46) (3.71) (2.43) (2.90) 
Fraction of independent directors t-1 0.132 0.172 0.129 0.214 
 (0.50) (0.65) (0.39) (0.64) 
CEO tenure=2 t-1 0.074 0.066 0.238 0.221 
 (0.58) (0.51) (1.38) (1.27) 
CEO tenure=3 t-1 -0.201 -0.203 -0.061 -0.051 
 (-1.29) (-1.30) (-0.28) (-0.24) 
CEO tenure=4 t-1 -0.063 -0.057 0.024 0.037 
 (-0.40) (-0.36) (0.11) (0.17) 
CEO tenure=5 t-1 0.097 0.103 0.022 0.033 
 (0.59) (0.63) (0.09) (0.14) 
CEO tenure=6 t-1 0.061 0.060 0.037 0.034 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.15) (0.13) 
CEO tenure>6 t-1 0.053 0.064 -0.328* -0.315* 
 (0.42) (0.50) (-1.77) (-1.69) 
CEO age>60 dummy t-1 0.354*** 0.353*** -1.604*** -1.607*** 
 (2.72) (2.70) (-4.17) (-4.16) 
CEO Chairman t-1 0.317** 0.322** 0.319* 0.321* 
 (2.34) (2.38) (1.68) (1.69) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5129 5129 5129 5129 
Pseudo R-sq 0.023 0.025 0.041 0.044 
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Table A6 
Section 3.1: Abnormal compensation and firm performance with additional board 
controls 
 
This table provides estimated coefficients from regressions on firm performance/valuation over the following year. The 
dependent variables include: Industry-adj. Tobin’s q (ROA) is the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q (ROA) and the 
mean value for all firms in the same Fama-French 12 industry. Abnormal return is the annual abnormal returns derived 
from a three-factor Fama-French model. The variables of interest include: CEO_DUE_TO_DIR is the portion of CEO 
compensation due to the director compensation variable, while DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the portion of director compensation 
due to the CEO compensation variable. Other control variables include: LnSales is the logarithm of sales in constant 2005 
pounds. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation based on daily stock return over the prior year. CPS is the fraction 
of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top five executive team captured by the CEO. CEO-director tie is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a CEO has at least one network tie with other directors through past employment (either working 
as an employee or serving on the board) or past educational institutions, and zero otherwise. Fraction of independent 
directors is the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. Fraction of busy directors is the ratio of the 
number of directors with three or more directorships to board size. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm le vel. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal  
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
Industry-adj. 
Tobin’s q 
Abnormal  
return 
Industry-adj. 
ROA 
CEO_DUE_TO_DIR t-1 -0.015* -0.197** -0.010 — — — 
 (-1.72) (-2.48) (-1.14)    
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — — — -0.024* -0.086** -0.008 
    (-1.78) (-2.27) (-0.95) 
CPS t-1 0.454** 0.039 0.056* 0.433* 0.267** 0.057* 
(2.12) (0.33) (1.74) (1.82) (2.35) (1.65) 
CEO-director tie t-1 -0.066 0.020 -0.011 -0.066 0.028 -0.011 
 (-1.12) (0.65) (-1.22) (-1.12) (0.93) (-1.20) 
Stock return volatility 0.043 0.315*** -0.045* 0.043 0.312*** -0.045* 
 (0.39) (3.98) (-1.81) (0.39) (3.92) (-1.81) 
LnSales t-1 0.002 -0.038*** 0.001 0.002 -0.036*** 0.001 
 (0.10) (-3.30) (0.20) (0.09) (-3.15) (0.21) 
Fraction of indep. dirs t-1 -0.096 -0.110 -0.040 -0.092 -0.160 -0.041 
 (-0.45) (-0.86) (-1.35) (-0.43) (-1.26) (-1.35) 
Fraction of busy dirs t-1 -0.042 0.080 -0.031 -0.040 0.062 -0.031 
 (-0.26) (0.91) (-1.32) (-0.25) (0.71) (-1.32) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5471 5592 5471 5471 5592 5471 
Adjusted R-sq 0.010 0.029 0.017 0.009 0.029 0.017 
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Table A7 
Section 3.2: Director abnormal compensation and CEO turnover controlling for board 
busyness 
 
This table displays the results of logit regressions on CEO turnover. The sample consists of 5,129 observations with 
available data on CEO turnover in year t (1999-2009) and explanatory variables in the year prior to the turnover. 
The dependent variables are the overall and forced turnover dummies. DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the proportion of 
director compensation due to the CEO compensation variable. Other control variables include: CEO pay slice (CPS) 
is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top five executive team captured by the CEO. CEO-
director tie is a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO has at least one network tie with other directors through 
past employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board) or past educational institutions, and zero 
otherwise. Board size is the number of executive and non-executive directors. Fraction of independent directors is 
the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. Fraction of busy directors is the ratio of the number 
of directors with three or more directorships to board size. Firm-specific return is the difference between firm stock 
return and Market return over the year prior to the CEO turnover, where Market return is the FTSE All Share index 
return. Tenure dummy equals one if CEO tenure falls within the corresponding range, e.g. CEO tenure=2 equals 
one if CEO tenure is between two and three years. CEO tenure=1 is the hold-out group. CEO age>60 dummy is a 
dummy equal to one if the CEO’s age is above 60, and zero otherwise. CEO Chairman is a dummy equal to one if 
the CEO is also the Chairman, and zero otherwise. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The industry dummies 
are based on the 12 Fama-French industries. 
 Overall turnover Forced turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 -0.186*** -0.121* -0.142** -0.088* 
 (-2.98) (-1.90) (-2.32) (-1.85) 
CPS t-1 — -1.457*** — -1.104** 
  (-3.95)  (-2.35) 
CEO-director tie t-1 — -0.180 — -0.286* 
  (-1.53)  (-1.76) 
Board size t-1 0.057*** 0.036* 0.054** 0.039 
 (2.99) (1.73) (2.31) (1.50) 
Fraction of indep. dirs t-1 -0.202 0.064 -0.033 0.172 
 (-0.81) (0.24) (-0.11) (0.51) 
Fraction of busy dirs t-1 0.351 0.547** 0.225 0.410 
 (1.63) (2.46) (0.74) (1.29) 
Firm-specific return t-1 -0.183* -0.190** -0.483*** -0.490*** 
 (-1.92) (-2.03) (-3.06) (-3.11) 
Market return t-1 7.062*** 6.806*** 5.948*** 5.745*** 
 (7.25) (7.12) (4.66) (4.53) 
CEO tenure=2 t-1 0.100 0.109 0.263 0.274 
 (0.77) (0.84) (1.51) (1.57) 
CEO tenure=3 t-1 -0.149 -0.141 -0.082 -0.063 
 (-0.95) (-0.89) (-0.38) (-0.29) 
CEO tenure=4 t-1 -0.034 -0.022 0.032 0.049 
 (-0.21) (-0.14) (0.15) (0.23) 
CEO tenure=5 t-1 0.142 0.141 0.036 0.037 
 (0.85) (0.83) (0.15) (0.15) 
CEO tenure=6 t-1 0.122 0.113 0.024 0.027 
 (0.68) (0.63) (0.10) (0.11) 
CEO tenure>6 t-1 0.067 0.072 -0.309* -0.304 
 (0.52) (0.57) (-1.66) (-1.63) 
CEO age>60 dummy t-1 0.482*** 0.463*** -1.627*** -1.632*** 
 (3.74) (3.53) (-4.23) (-4.24) 
CEO Chairman t-1 0.294** 0.266** 0.289 0.273 
 (2.24) (2.02) (1.51) (1.41) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5129 5129 5129 5129 
Pseudo R-sq 0.058 0.062 0.067 0.070 
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Table A8 
Section 3.2: Director abnormal compensation and CEO turnover performance sensitivity 
controlling for board busyness 
 
This table examines whether director abnormal compensation affects CEO turnover performance sensitivity. The sample 
consists of 5,129 observations with available data on CEO turnover in year t (1999-2009) and explanatory variables in 
the year prior to the turnover. The dependent variables are the overall and forced turnover dummies. The variables of 
interest include: Firm-specific return and its interaction with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, where Firm-specific return is the 
difference between firm stock return and the market return over the year prior to the CEO turnover. Positive firm-
specific return and Negative firm-specific return and their interactions with DIR_DUE_TO_CEO, where Positive 
(Negative) firm-specific return is the firm-specific return if that return is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO is the proportion of director compensation due to the CEO compensation variable. The other 
control variables are the same as in Table 6 model 2. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The industry dummies are 
based on the 12 Fama-French industries. 
 Overall turnover  Forced turnover  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 -0.122* 0.029 -0.073* 0.223 
 (-1.94) (0.32) (-1.81) (1.12) 
Firm-specific return t-1 -0.190** — -0.548*** — 
 (-1.99)  (-3.38)  
Firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 0.010 — 0.214** — 
 (0.09)  (2.46)  
Positive firm-specific return t-1 — -0.015 — -0.107 
  (-0.19)  (-0.77) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1 — -0.786*** — -1.247*** 
  (-3.81)  (-4.83) 
Positive firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — -0.135 — 0.003 
  (-1.15)  (0.03) 
Negative firm-specific return t-1×DIR_DUE_TO_CEO t-1 — 0.775** — 0.865** 
  (2.37)  (2.21) 
Market return t-1 6.807*** 6.879*** 5.745*** 5.626*** 
 (7.11) (7.08) (4.56) (4.44) 
CPS t-1 -1.457*** -1.414*** -1.072** -1.049** 
 (-3.95) (-3.83) (-2.28) (-2.24) 
CEO-director tie t-1 -0.181 -0.186 -0.287* -0.301* 
 (-1.54) (-1.58) (-1.77) (-1.85) 
Board size t-1 0.036* 0.046** 0.039 0.053** 
 (1.73) (2.18) (1.51) (2.08) 
Fraction of independent directors t-1 0.064 0.133 0.185 0.289 
 (0.24) (0.50) (0.55) (0.86) 
Fraction of busy directors t-1 0.547** 0.513** 0.402 0.361 
 (2.46) (2.31) (1.26) (1.14) 
CEO tenure=2 t-1 0.109 0.095 0.273 0.252 
 (0.83) (0.73) (1.56) (1.42) 
CEO tenure=3 t-1 -0.140 -0.146 -0.055 -0.048 
 (-0.89) (-0.92) (-0.25) (-0.22) 
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CEO tenure=4 t-1 -0.023 -0.013 0.053 0.073 
 (-0.14) (-0.08) (0.24) (0.33) 
CEO tenure=5 t-1 0.141 0.152 0.045 0.062 
 (0.83) (0.90) (0.18) (0.25) 
CEO tenure=6 t-1 0.112 0.105 0.028 0.019 
 (0.62) (0.58) (0.11) (0.07) 
CEO tenure>6 t-1 0.072 0.083 -0.299 -0.287 
 (0.57) (0.65) (-1.60) (-1.52) 
CEO age>60 dummy t-1 0.463*** 0.463*** -1.634*** -1.641*** 
 (3.53) (3.51) (-4.25) (-4.25) 
CEO Chairman t-1 0.267** 0.271** 0.277 0.284 
 (2.02) (2.05) (1.44) (1.48) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5129 5129 5129 5129 
Pseudo R-sq 0.062 0.066 0.072 0.076 
 
